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In Kyllo v. United States, Justice Antonin Scalia cautioned that without 
proper Fourth Amendment restraints, police officers’ use of modern 
surveillance technology would end the privacy of the home, exposing intimate 
details, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily 
sauna and bath.”1  Based on these privacy concerns, Kyllo held that police 
could not use “sense-enhancing technology” to obtain “information regarding 
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’” at least if the 
technology “is not in general public use.”2 
																																																								
 + J.D., 2013, Harvard Law School; B.A., 2004, University of Virginia; Police Officer, New York 
City Police Department (NYPD), 2006–2010.  The author wishes to thank Emily Dempsey, 
Michael Klarman, and Jeannie Suk for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.  The author also 
thanks the Catholic University Law Review for superb editing. 
 1. 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
 2. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
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Although Kyllo clearly applies to the home—“‘the very core’ of the Fourth 
Amendment”3—it remains unclear how far this rule extends.  Does Kyllo also 
apply to scanning devices located on public streets?  Would the Court have the 
same reaction if police were interested in finding not “the lady of the house” 
but rather persons carrying illegal guns? 
The problem of illegal firearms is far more serious than Justice Scalia’s 
bathtub hypothetical.  In 2010, 67.5% of homicides were committed using 
firearms in the United States. 4   The total cost of gun violence, including 
medical care, policing, prisons, and social services reaches a staggering $100 
billion annually. 5   In response, police departments nationwide have taken 
aggressive steps to combat illegal guns by increasing their use of stop, 
question, and frisk tactics.  These practices have raised a new set of concerns.  
In 2011, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) stopped 694,660 
individuals6—approximately 8.5% of the city’s entire 8.2 million population.7  
Of those stopped, 86.7% were African American or Hispanic.8  The sheer 
number of stops, combined with the racial imbalance, ignited numerous 
protests from New York City communities and their elected officials.9 
																																																								
 3. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511). 
 4. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offenses-know 
n-to-law-enforcement/expanded/expandhomicidemain.pdf. 
 5. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 11 (2000).  The 
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a police research group, conducted a study of total gun 
violence costs across six cities in a one-week period and found the total cost to be over $38 
million.  Erica Goode, Police Chiefs Focus on Disparities in Gun Violence with an Eye Towards 
Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at A10.   
 6. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK CITY 15 
(2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/year 
end2011enforcementreport.pdf.. 
 7. Id. at B-1. 
 8. Id.  In the 2010 Census, 51.4% of New York City’s total population was identified as 
African American or Hispanic.  Id.  In addition, some Caucasian residents in gentrifying 
neighborhoods of the city, such as Williamsburg, have complained about excessive police stops, 
claiming that the practice discriminates based on class, not race.  See Simone Weichselbaum, 
Young White Men in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, Say They’re Targets of NYPD’s Stop & Frisk 
Tactics, Too, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2012, 10:20 PM), http://articles.nydailynews.com 
/2012-03-24/news/31235095_1_frisk-targets-white-guys-23rd-precinct (providing a Williamsburg 
resident’s belief that he was stereotyped). 
 9. See, e.g., John Eligon, Taking on Police Tactic, Critics Hit Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2012, at A1, A3 (observing that the divide over the stop-and-frisk practices among 
legislators revolved around the varying constituents they represent); Michael M. Grynbaum, 
Public Advocate to Call for Audit of Police Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2012, at 
A17 (noting the backlash against the practice by NYC legislators); Glenn Blain, State Attorney 
General Eric Schneiderman Is Looking into the NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Policy, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/state-attorney-general 
-eric-schneiderman-nypd-stop-frisk-policy-article-1.1059520 (discussing New York’s Attorney 
General’s disdain for the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practice); Michael Cummings, In New York, Be 
Black (or Latino), Be Stopped, Be Frisked, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 13,  
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The problem that the NYPD asserts it is addressing is also startling in its 
magnitude and racial disparity: 489 people were murdered in New York City 
in 2011, 88.1% of whom were African American or Hispanic.10  Similarly, in 
2011, 96% of the 1,821 shooting victims in New York City and 96.4% of 
shooting assailants were identified as African American or Hispanic.11 
But what if there was a better way to do stop, question, and frisk?  What if 
the police could obtain identical benefits without exposing thousands of 
citizens to the fear and resentment of being frisked, while also reducing danger 
for officers?12  Regardless of one’s opinion of the efficacy of stop-and-frisks,13 
police and citizens alike can agree that fewer stops would be better, provided 
there was an equally, if not more, effective way to remove illegal guns and 
reduce crime. 
Cutting edge technology may provide an answer.  The NYPD believes that 
“gun scanners” now in development are one such solution.  The NYPD is 
currently testing prototype devices that use passive imaging technology to 
detect the outline of weapons underneath individuals’ clothing, without 
revealing any anatomical details.14  These “gun scanners” could operate from 
up to eighty feet away, allowing officers to see from a safe distance whether a 




(noting the sheer number of stops). 
 10. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 6, at 1.  Homicide statistics include both murder and 
non-negligent manslaughter.  Id. 
 11. Id. at 11. 
 12. The NYPD has lost 697 officers in the line of duty, more than any other police 
department in the country.  Law Enforcement Facts, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
MEMORIAL FUND, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  The 
latest victim, Officer Peter Figoski, was shot in the face by a felon carrying an illegal handgun.  
Rocco Parascandola & Helen Kennedy, Hero NYPD Cop Peter Figoski Shot & Killed by Robber 
in Cypress Hills, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011, 8:18 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/shot-face-robbery-cypress-hills-cops-article-1.990216.  
Despite a fall in overall incidents of violent crime nationally, the number of law enforcement 
officers killed has risen steadily in recent years.  Michael S. Schmidt & Joseph Goldstein, Killing 
of Police Officers Continues Rising as Violence Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, at A1. 
 13. See, e.g., GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., SUMMARY OF THE RAND REPORT ON 
NYPD’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK 4 (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam 
/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT329.pdf (concluding that racial bias was not a significant 
factor in the NYPD’s overall stop, question, and frisk practices); Conference Paper, John 
Lamberth, The Effectiveness of Stop and Frisk in the United States 2 (Aug. 10–11, 2011), 
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/US_Lamberth_The_Effectiveness_of_Stop_and_Frisk_in_the_United_
StatesFinal.pdf (finding no crime-reduction benefit to stop, question, and frisk practices). 
 14. Al Baker, Police Working on Technology to Detect Concealed Guns, N.Y. TIMES BLOG 
(Jan 17, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/police-working-on 
-technology-to-detect-concealed-guns (describing the tool as a type of “reverse infrared mapping 
tool . . . [that] pinpoint[s] where [radiation] is blocked”). 
 15. Id. 
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This technology, however, raises a new set of troubling questions.  Are gun 
scanners a panacea for law enforcement to address illegal gun violence while 
reducing resentment over stop, question, and frisk practices?  Or do  
gun scanners foreshadow an “Orwellian world,”16 where each technological 
advance is another step backward for privacy rights? 
Commentators have previously addressed these questions in a theoretical 
context, when gun scanners were mere possibilities.17  However, now that the 
NYPD is actively testing prototypes, this Article re-evaluates the 
constitutionality of gun scanners.  This Article approaches the issue in light of 
the Supreme Court’s Kyllo jurisprudence on technology and the Fourth 
Amendment and the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones. 18  
Additionally, this Article compares gun scanners to portable radiation 
detectors—already in widespread use by police departments—to highlight 
shortcomings in the Court’s rule in Kyllo and to advocate for a new doctrine. 
Part I of this Article discusses how gun scanners and radiation detectors 
function and what information police are able to see when using these devices.  
Part II examines relevant Supreme Court precedent, including decisions 
pertaining to the use of technology by the police and the permissibility of 
suspicionless checkpoint searches.  Part III applies the current doctrine to gun 
scanners to determine whether they might be constitutionally permissible in 
various situations.  Finally, Part IV compares the legality of gun scanners to 
radiation detectors—showing some uncomfortable contradictions—and 
highlighting the need for a new, coherent rule that can adapt sensibly to  
ever-advancing law enforcement technology. 
I.  THE TECHNOLOGY 
Law enforcement agencies have always searched for a technological edge in 
combating crime and improving officer safety.  From fingerprints to DNA 
testing to bullet-resistant vests, police departments’ demands for safety and 
investigative tools drive innovation in the field.  New technology, however, 
often generates new constitutional questions.19 
																																																								
 16. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Jon S. Vernick et al., Technologies to Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth 
Amendment Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement Tool, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
567, 571 (2003) (providing a theoretical overview of gun scanners from a time when no devices 
were in production and offering a public health perspective on the costs of gun violence). 
 18. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the attachment of GPS 
tracking devices to a suspect’s vehicle without a validly executed warrant is an unconstitutional 
search). 
 19. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (holding that taking a blood 
sample from a defendant arrested for drunk driving is constitutional); see also George M. Dery, 
Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging Lie Detection Technology, 31 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 242–43 (2004) (discussing the Fourth Amendment issues regarding thermal 
eye imaging). 
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A.  Gun Scanners 
On January 17, 2012, NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly 
announced that the NYPD was developing gun-scanning technology in 
conjunction with the U.S. Department of Defense.20  The NYPD gun scanners, 
developed in partnership with the Pentagon’s Combating Terrorism Technical 
Support Office (CTTSO),21 use “Terahertz Imaging Detection” to screen for 
weapons.22  The prototype scanner employs passive imaging technology to 
allow officers to see the outline of weapons concealed underneath a person’s 
clothing, without revealing other anatomical details.23 
Specifically, all persons and objects emit electromagnetic radiation (similar 
to thermal radiation) in the terahertz range.24  These emissions are particularly 
useful for security purposes because the rays pass through clothing but not 
through metal.25  The gun scanners detect differences in terahertz radiation 
emissions, producing an image that shows the outline of any concealed 
weapons on a suspect’s body. 26   This imaging is accomplished passively, 
																																																								
 20. Baker, supra note 14. 
 21. Carmen Cox, NYPD and Defense Department Testing Gun Scan Technology, ABC 
NEWS RADIO (Jan. 17, 2012), http://abcnewsradioonline.com/national-news/nypd-and-defense 
-department-testing-gun-scan-technology.html.  The CTTSO partners with companies to develop 
technology for military and law enforcement use.  About the CTTSO, COMBATING TERRORISM 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT OFFICE, http://www.cttso.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 22. NYPD, Feds Testing Gun-Scanning Technology but Civil Liberties Groups up in Arms, 
CBS N.Y. (Jan. 17, 2012 11:59 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/01/17/nypd-testing-gun 
-scanning-technology [hereinafter Civil Liberties Groups up in Arms] (noting that the device can 
measure a body’s energy up to sixteen feet away). 
 23. Baker, supra note 14.  For a sample image from one of the NYPD’s prototype gun 
scanners, see NYPD Tests Technology to Detect Concealed Firearms at a Distance, NBC N.Y. 
(Jan. 18, 2012, 6:49 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYPD-Gun-Scanning 
-Technology-Gun-Detectors-Police-137507933.html [hereinafter NYPD Tests Technology]. 
 24. ThruVision TS4 Overview, DIGITAL BARRIERS, http://www.digitalbarriers.com 
/thruvision-ts4/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter TS4 Overview]. 
 25. See Detect Terrorist-Related Contraband with Terahertz Technology, ARGONNE NAT’L 
LAB. (Sept. 2004), http://web.anl.gov/techtransfer/pdf/Profile_Terahertz_facility.pdf (noting that 
terahertz technology can “easily penetrate cloth and plastic to detect and image contraband 
materials”); see also New T-ray Source Could Improve Airport Security, Cancer Detection, 
SCIENCE DAILY (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/07112612 
1732.htm (describing terahertz radiation as promising for security because it does not penetrate 
metals); Terahertz Waves Penetrate the World of Imaging, OPTICS.ORG (Sept. 24, 2002), 
http://optics.org/article/9937 (noting that terahertz technology is one of the hottest topics in 
photonics because of its unique properties). 
 26. Joe Kemp, NYPD Looks to Scan People on the Street for Guns, Police Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:07 AM), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-01-17/news/30637353_1_nypd-guns-police-commissioner-r 
aymond-kelly.  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories is already using the unique terahertz 
radiation frequency emitted by the molecules in explosive materials to design bomb-detection 
equipment for the military.  Terahertz Spectroscopic Imaging for Standoff Detection of High 
Explosives, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NAT’L LABORATORY (Apr. 1, 2008), https://www 
-eng.llnl.gov/meas_tech/meas_tech_explosives.html.  In the future, terahertz scanning might be 
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without subjecting individuals to additional radiation, unlike the airport 
security scanning machines operated by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA).27 
The NYPD is currently testing prototype gun scanners28 at its firearms and 
tactics training facility.29  Presently, the devices are only effective from three 
to four meters away, but the NYPD expects future versions to function at a 
distance of twenty-five meters, allowing them to be mounted on NYPD patrol 
vehicles.30  Additionally, the devices are bulky (about the size of a desktop 
computer) with a separate monitor for viewing images; the NYPD anticipates 
that future models will be reduced in size.31 
While stressing the need to reduce the presence of illegal guns, 
Commissioner Kelly has stated unequivocally that officers would only use gun 
scanners in “reasonably suspicious circumstances” and not for blanket public 
scans.32  Civil liberties advocates have had mixed reactions to the NYPD’s 
announcement, stressing the benefits of reduced police stops while also 
worrying about privacy loss.33  Donna Lieberman, Executive Director the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, stated: 
																																																																																																																																
able to identify the specific molecular signature of materials in firearms, without the need to 
contrast it with the natural terahertz radiation emanating from human bodies.  Id. 
 27. AIT: How It Works, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/ait-how-it-works (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013).  The TSA employs two types of imaging technologies: millimeter wave 
detection and backscatter x-ray.  Id.  Unlike passive terahertz imaging, both devices expose 
passengers to low levels (considered harmless) of electromagnetic radiation or x-rays.  Id.  
Additionally, the TSA scanning devices reveal anatomical details of passengers.  Id.  When 
initially implemented, these machines were the subject of considerable public disapproval and 
fear.  See, e.g., Deborah Kotz, Radiation Experts Concerned with TSA Airport Security Scanners, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family 
-health/cancer/articles/2010/11/18/radiation-experts-concerned-with-tsa-airport-security-scanners 
(expressing privacy and radiation exposure concerns). 
 28. The NYPD did not announce which company was designing its gun scanners; however, 
ThruVision, a British company, has already deployed stationary terahertz imaging devices in the 
United Kingdom and Dubai.  Camera ‘Looks’ Through Clothing, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7287135.stm.  ThruVision claims that its passive terahertz 
devices can detect weapons from up to ten meters away.  TS4 Overview, supra note 24. 
 29. Keith Wagstaff, Police Developing Tech to Virtually Frisk People from 82 Feet Away, 
TIME (Jan. 20, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/20/police-developing-tech-to-virtually 
-frisk-people-from-82-feet-away. 
 30. Jamie Schram, NYPD Developing New Device to Detect Guns Carried by Criminals, 
N.Y. POST (Jan. 17, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/nypd_developing 
_new_device_to_detect_HpGz6WUXC9Ji7qaifcCxkN (stating that, although the devices 
currently only work at short distances, the NYPD hopes that they will eventually operate at much 
greater distances). 
 31. Jamie Schram & Bill Sanderson, NYPD New ‘Wave’ of Friskless Search, N.Y. POST 
(Jan. 18, 2012, 2:35 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/nypd_new_wave_of 
_friskless_search_6w45z56yELmCxNWZlncjtN. 
 32. Civil Liberties Groups up in Arms, supra note 22. 
 33. Wagstaff, supra note 29 (discussing the costs and benefits of gun-scanning technology). 
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We find this proposal both intriguing and worrisome. On the one 
hand, if technology like this worked as it was billed, New York City 
should see its stop-and-frisk rate drop by a half-million people a 
year. On the other hand, the ability to walk down the street free 
from a virtual police pat-down is a matter of privacy.34 
However, because the technology is still being tested, it is too early to assume 
that police officers’ use of the technology will infringe on individuals’ privacy 
rights.35 
B.  Radiation Detectors	
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, one of the most 
persistent fears has been the threat of nuclear terrorism using either an 
improvised nuclear device (IND) or a radiological dispersal device (“RDD” or 
“dirty bomb”).36  Given the devastating potential from nuclear attacks, law 
enforcement agencies have developed counter-measures to detect radioactive 
materials.37 
Unsurprisingly, New York City has been at the forefront of deploying 
technology to detect nuclear devices, due in large part to funding from the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Securing the Cities initiative 
(STC).38  Although some of this technology is stationed at fixed points for 
special events, such as the U.S. Open tennis tournament or New Year’s Eve in 
																																																								
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal 
Device and Improvised Nuclear Device Incidents, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,029, 45,029–48 (Aug. 1, 
2008).  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an IND as: “[A]n illicit nuclear 
weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear State, or a weapon fabricated by a 
terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear 
explosion.”  Id. at 45,031.  RDDs include any “device that causes the purposeful dissemination of 
radioactive material, across an area with the intent to cause harm, without a nuclear detonation 
occurring.”  Id. at 45,048. 
 37. See Status Report on Federal and Local Efforts to Secure Radiological Sources: Field 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology 
of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 25–27 (2009) (statement of Capt. Michael 
Riggio, NYPD Counterterrorism Division); see also Counterterrorism Units, N.Y.C. POLICE 
DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 38. DHS Supports Exercise of Securing the Cities Program Designed to Detect Radiological 
and Nuclear Threats, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://blog.dhs.gov/2011/04/dhs 
-supports-exercise-of-securing.html (stating that DHS has purchased over 5,800 pieces of 
radiation-detection equipment for the NYPD and neighboring law enforcement agencies in the 
New York City metropolitan area).  STC also involves large-scale inter-agency drills to simulate 
detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear devices in New York City.  Id.  The funding 
provided by DHS is substantial, topping $151 million in 2012.  Joseph Straw, New York City 
Counterterror Grants Hold Steady for Third Year Despite Smaller Pot: Officials, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-york-city-counterterror 
-grants-hold-steady-year-smaller-pot-officials-article-1.1024391. 
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Times Square,39 the NYPD has thousands of small, portable radiation detectors 
deployed with officers across New York City every day.  According to one 
NYPD commander, these “smart phone-size radiation detectors” are “the new 
normal” for addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism.40 
Currently, over 2,000 such “Personal Radiation Detectors” (PRDs)41  are 
deployed by the NYPD.42  The units resemble a beeper and are small enough to 
attach to a police officer’s belt. 43   PRDs function by detecting gamma 
radiation—electromagnetic energy that radioactive substances emit 
constantly.44   If a PRD detects gamma radiation, it vibrates and emits an 
audible alarm to alert the officer.45  The device also has a digital readout to 
indicate the strength of the gamma radiation source.46  Currently, the device 
only alerts the officer carrying it, but, in the near future, the NYPD will be able 
to use wireless transmission devices to send all PRD alarms to a central 
command facility.47 
																																																								
 39. See Sean Gardiner, NYPD Prepares Security Dragnet, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2011, at 
A20 (noting heavy security at the U.S. Tennis Tournament in Flushing, Queens); see also NYPD 
to Ring in 2012 with Tight Security at Times Square, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-12-30/new-years-eve-times-square/52289042/1 
(describing police protection of Times Square on New Year’s Eve). 
 40. NYC Subway’s Anti-Terror Steps the New Normal, CBS NEWS (July 18, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-20080279.html (quoting Inspector Scott Shanley of the 
NYPD’s Counterterrorism Division). 
 41. Thermo Fisher Scientific manufactures the device used by the NYPD, called the 
“RadEye PRD Personal Radiation Detector.”  For pictures and technical specifications of the 
product, see RadEye PRD, THERMO SCIENTIFIC, http://www.thermoscientific.com/ecomm/servlet 
/productsdetail_11152_L10982_81904_12811385_-1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).  According to 
the New York State Office of General Services, the NYPD pays $2,171.98 for each RadEye PRD 
device.  Procurement: Thermo Fisher, N.Y. ST. OFF. OF GEN. SERVICES, http://www.ogs.ny. 
gov/purchase/spg/pdfdocs/3823219745PL_Thermo.pdf (last updated Mar. 2012). 
 42. Jonathan Allen, New York Police Launch System to Detect and Track Radiation, 
REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2011, 12:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/us-newyork 
-radiation-idUSTRE7720D220110803. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Radeye Selection Guide: Handheld Detection for Any Scenario, THERMO SCIENTIFIC 
(Aug. 2012), http://static.thermoscientific.com/images/D16620~.pdf [hereinafter Radeye 
Selection Guide]; Gamma Rays, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://epa.gov/rpdweb00/understand/gamma.html.  Gamma rays are energy created by the decay 
of the nuclei of radioactive atoms.  Id. 
 45. See RadEye PRD, supra note 41 (describing the device in detail). 
 46. Id.; Radeye Selection Guide, supra note 44 (stating that the PRD can measure gamma 
radiation in a variety of units, including rem per hour, sieverts per hour, Roentgens per hour, and 
counts per second (CPS)). 
 47. CBS News Online, Fighting Terrorism in New York City, YOUTUBE (Sept. 25, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nf_PzCfpPug (giving viewers an inside look into the NYPD); 
Tom Hays, NYPD Pioneers New Dirty Bomb Detection System, NBC N.Y. (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYPD-Security-Counterterror-Radiation-Dirty-Bomb-1 
26388863.html. 
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Although the PRDs are accurate in detecting gamma radiation, the device 
cannot discern specific materials.48  This is problematic because some common 
materials, like granite, emit harmless but still detectable levels of radiation.49  
Even if the PRDs correctly identify a source of radiation coming from a 
person, some materials that contain potentially dangerous radioactive materials 
also have legitimate civilian uses, such as Troxler gauges for measuring soil 
density.50  The most problematic false alarms, however, come from individuals 
who have undergone certain medical diagnostic tests or cancer treatments that 
use radioactive materials.51  Because some law enforcement agencies have had 
embarrassing mishaps in dealing with these patients,52 the NYPD has alerted 
its personnel to the potential for false alarms from “medicinal sources.”53  
Nevertheless, patients who are stopped must still explain the reason for the 
radiation, potentially requiring them to reveal very personal medical 
information to the police.54 
II.  THE LAW 
The critical Fourth Amendment questions for analyzing the permissibility of 
gun scanners are whether they constitute a “search,” and if so, whether a 
																																																								
 48. Detecting Radiation, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/about 
-nrc/radiation/health-effects/detection-radiation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (noting that the 
devices cannot determine the precise radioactive element detected). 
 49. See Granite Countertops and Radiation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/tenorm/granite-countertops.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2012) 
(describing radioactivity in granite).  Additionally, smoke detectors contain minute amounts of 
Americium-241, another radioactive material.  See Americium, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last 
updated Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/americium.html. 
 50. See Model 3440 Surface Moisture-Density Gauge, TROXLER ELEC. LABS., 
http://www.troxlerlabs.com/products/3440.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (delineating uses for a 
Troxler gauge). 
 51. See, e.g., Radiation Therapy for Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Therapy/radiation (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) 
(stating that radiation therapy can help kill cancer cells by damaging their DNA); What Is Nuclear 
Medicine?, STANFORD UNIV. SCH. OF MED., http://nuclearmedicine.stanford.edu/patient_care 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (describing some medical treatments that involve the use of 
radioactive materials). 
 52. See Kalyan Kumar Gangopadhyay et al., Triggering Radiation Alarms After 
Radioiodine Treatment, 333 BRITISH MED. J. 293, 293–94 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1526947 (recounting the story of a  
forty-six-year-old man who set off radiation detectors at Orlando Airport and was subsequently 
strip-searched by the TSA because of a radioiodine diagnostic test he had undergone six weeks 
earlier). 
 53. Bob Hennelly, How NY Officials Prepare for Threat of a Dirty Bomb, WNYC (Apr. 16, 
2010), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2010/apr/16/how-ny-officials-prepare-for-threat 
-of-a-dirty-bomb (describing situations in which medicinal sources have lead to a “false hit”). 
 54. See Keeping “Hot” Patients Cool During Holiday Travel, CARDINALHEALTH 
(November 2009), http://nps.cardinal.com/nps/thelink/issues/11192009.asp (recounting examples 
of medical patients stopped by security personnel because of their radiation levels). 
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warrantless search is “unreasonable” under the Constitution.55  Although the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has wavered in its insistence for 
police to obtain search warrants,56 some areas in the law of searches are well 
defined. 
A.  Arrests & Terry Stops 
Arrests and Terry stops are the most basic forms of police conduct during 
which a warrantless search may be deemed constitutional.  Generally, as long 
as the arrest or stop is valid, a warrantless search for weapons will be 
permissible.57  During an arrest, if the police have probable cause that an 
individual has committed an offense, a “subsequent search . . . having been 
made incident to that lawful arrest [is] likewise valid.”58  Under the search 
“incident to a lawful arrest” exception,59 the police may frisk and search an 
individual for weapons, go through his or her pockets and belongings,60 and 
even take the clothes on the individual’s back as evidence of a crime without 
any particularized suspicion or warrant.61  In sum, the constitutionality of the 
search hinges entirely on the validity of the arrest.62 
With regard to Terry stops, the allowable police intrusion is more 
circumscribed than during an arrest, authorizing only a “carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might 
be used to assault [the police officer].”63  This brief stop requires only that the 
																																																								
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see also Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (describing the typical Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 56. Compare United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 423 (1976) (holding warrantless 
arrests permissible, provided the police had probable cause), with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 763–64 (1969) (requiring a warrant for a search of defendant’s home incident to arrest, 
despite the existence of evidence amounting to probable cause).  Justice Byron White, author of 
the majority opinion in Watson, consistently opposed expanding the warrant requirement and, not 
surprisingly, he dissented in Chimel.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 780 (White, J., dissenting). 
 57. See infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 58. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959). 
 59. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“It is well settled that a search 
incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 641–42, 648 (1983) (upholding a search in 
which an arrested person was ordered to empty his pockets). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974) (upholding the 
admissibility of clothing taken as evidence). 
 62. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (reasoning that a lawful arrest, by itself, authorizes a search).  
There may, however, be some limits to highly intrusive searches, such as strip searches, in the 
case of a non-indictable arrest.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 
1522–23 (2012) (requiring reasonable suspicion for strip searches in non-indictable arrests). 
 63. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting police officers to stop and temporarily 
detain individuals based on reasonable suspicion of criminality and subsequently frisk those 
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officer “observe[] unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in 
light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot.”64  Similar to arrests, the 
constitutionality of any frisk, and the admissibility of any evidence it produces, 
hinges on the validity of the Terry stop itself.65  As long as the stop is valid, the 
police may frisk for weapons, but may not conduct a full search.66 
B.  Police Investigations 
The threshold, and usually dispositive, question for any warrantless 
information gathering by the police is whether it constitutes a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment. 67   If the police investigation amounts to a  
“search,” then it is “presumptively unreasonable,”68 unless an “‘exceptional  
situation’ . . . justif[ies] creating a new exception to the warrant 
requirement.”69  Some “exceptions” to the warrant requirement do exist, for 
example, the existence of exigent circumstances70 or for information freely 
given to third parties. 71   However, in the case of visual observations of 
defendants by the police without a warrant, the Court typically decides cases 
not on whether an “exception” applies, but on whether the activity even 
constitutes a “search.”72 
In Kyllo, the Court redefined what constitutes a “search” in the context of 
technologically enhanced police observations: “We think that obtaining by 
																																																																																																																																
individuals for weapons to protect the officers’ safety).  However, Terry did not authorize 
“general exploratory search[es]” during such stops.  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Compare Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (excluding evidence because the 
police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant), with Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 146 (1972) (finding the officer’s fear for his safety justified and admitting evidence seized 
during a Terry stop). 
 66. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31 (upholding properly performed frisks as constitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 67. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (calling the “antecedent” question of 
the Fourth Amendment whether or not a search occurred). 
 68. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
 69. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978) (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 
34 (1970)). 
 70. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 (describing emergency and dangerous situations as “exigent 
circumstances”). 
 71. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the police may, without a 
warrant, obtain records of telephone numbers dialed because the individuals knew that they were 
relaying this information to the telephone company, a third party). 
 72. Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (finding that a police 
helicopter flying in a public airway that discovers marijuana in defendant’s backyard does not 
constitute a “search”), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 284–85 (1983) (finding 
that the warrantless monitoring of an individual’s movements by a beeper was not a “search” 
because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements on 
public thoroughfares), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the 
government listening to a defendant’s phone conversation inside a telephone booth was a 
“search” because it violated his legitimate expectation of privacy). 
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sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) 
the technology in question is not in general public use.”73  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, concluded that police surveillance using such 
enhanced imaging technology is a search and is “presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant.”74  Applying this rule to a thermal scan of the outside of a 
marijuana grower’s home, the Court found that the police’s actions violated the 
Fourth Amendment.75 
It remains unclear whether the Kyllo rule is limited to the home or whether it 
applies in all “core” Fourth Amendment areas, including searches of one’s 
person.  No Supreme Court cases since Kyllo have reached this question.  
Although Kyllo focuses on the special constitutional protections owed to the 
home,76 three considerations make it likely that Kyllo’s rule is also good law 
for searches of a person.77  First, in previous cases, the Court has stated that 
“the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police” is, like 
one’s home, “at the core of the Fourth Amendment.”78  Second, the majority’s 
rationale in Kyllo relies heavily on the text of the Fourth Amendment and its 
original meaning with regard to its intended degree of privacy protection.79  
Like one’s home, security of one’s “person” is explicitly protected by the  
text of the Fourth Amendment.80   Third, even the Kyllo dissent, although 
disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion, believed that it would be foolish to 
limit Kyllo’s rule to the home.81 
The determination of whether a “search” occurred in Kyllo is simply a 
technology-specific application of the Court’s general Fourth Amendment 
search test from Katz v. United States: did the person “exhibit[] an actual 
																																																								
 73. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 74. Id. at 40. 
 75. Id. at 40–41.  The police’s thermal scan revealed only relative differences in hot and 
cold areas of the house and could not create images of people inside of the home.  Id. at 41, 49 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  A reproduction of the image of the defendant’s home is included in the 
Appendix of the decision.  Id. at 52; see also FLIR T-Series Infrared Cameras, FLIR, 
http://www.flir.com/thermography/americas/us/products/tseries/gallery (select second photo from 
the right) (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (providing a sample thermal image from the company that 
manufactured the camera used in Kyllo). 
 76. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at 
the entrance to the house.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))). 
 77. See infra text accompanying notes 78–81. 
 78. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25, 27 (1949)), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 79. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 81. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48–49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Clearly, a rule that is designed to 
protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment should not be 
limited to the home.”). 
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(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and was that expectation “one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable?’”82  Although the majority in Kyllo 
cites, but does not explicitly apply, the Katz test,83 the dissent concludes that 
even if police use of the thermal-imaging scanner constituted a search, society 
does not recognize an interest in protecting the privacy of heat emitting from 
one’s home.84  Therefore, Kyllo is also important for what it reveals about the 
Justices’ attitudes concerning the workability of the Katz test.85  Notably, in 
2012, a majority of the Court joined Justice Scalia in United States v. Jones, a 
case that explicitly disclaimed reliance on Katz in ruling that police installation 
of GPS tracker devices without a properly executed warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment.86 
The application of the Katz analysis to Fourth Amendment cases is 
controversial,87 even among the Justices.  The dissenters in Kyllo raised several 
objections to the majority’s rule and proposed a holding that would only 
restrict “sense-enhancing technology” if “it provides its user with the 
functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched.”88  As long 
																																																								
 82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  In Katz, the 
FBI recorded the defendant’s conversations about illegal gambling in a public phone booth, 
which the prosecutors introduced as evidence at trial.  Id. at 348.  On appeal, the Court reframed 
its Fourth Amendment analysis, deciding the case not on the question of whether a phone booth 
was a “constitutionally protected area,” but on whether a person had a “reasonable” expectation 
of privacy in a closed phone booth.  Id. at 350, 352.  This flexible test, as articulated in Justice 
John Marshall Harlan’s concurrence, is the cornerstone of the Court’s modern Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure jurisprudence.  See David A. Skalansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and 
Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 157 (2002) (discussing the “lasting effects” of Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence on the law of search and seizure). 
 83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 84. Id. at 43–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a subjective expectation of privacy in 
heat emanating from one’s home is “implausible” and “unreasonable”). 
 85. See Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice 
Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1015 (2001) (arguing that “Kyllo shows 
that a majority of the Court shares Justice Scalia’s doubt about the usefulness of the Katz test”). 
 86. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“[The defendant’s] Fourth 
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).  However, Jones did not claim 
to overrule Katz; rather, the majority relied on the theory that attaching the GPS device 
constituted a trespass and, because the government was also looking for information, was 
therefore a search.  Id. at 951, 954 (noting that future cases may have to “resort” to the Katz 
analysis). 
 87. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004) (“The Katz ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ test has proven more a revolution on paper than in practice.”); Skalansky, 
supra note 82, at 161 (noting that Justice Scalia, among others, has “soured” on the Katz doctrine, 
in part, because of the abundance of “contradictions and indeterminacy” in modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 88. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Given the composition of the majority in 
Kyllo and subsequent changes in the Court’s membership, the dissenters’ rationale may prevail in 
any future case challenging gun scanners or radiation detectors.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.  Justice 
Antonin Scalia authored the majority opinion in Kyllo, joined by Justices David Souter, Clarence 
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as the technology does not give the police the equivalent experience of being 
inside a protected space, then “public officials should not have to avert their 
senses or their equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain such 
as excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne 
particulates, or radioactive emissions.”89  The dissenters asserted that detecting 
such “hazards to the community” was an “entirely reasonable public service.”90 
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out a logical flaw in the Kyllo majority’s 
rule for permissible law enforcement technology: it contradicts the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Place, which held that a narcotics dog’s sniff was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it “discloses only the 
presence or absence of narcotics.”91  Under this logic, the dissent concluded, 
“it must follow that sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but 
illegal activity is not a search either.”92  Yet, under the majority’s holding, a 
drug-detection machine would be unconstitutional—unless somehow in 
“general use”—while a drug-sniffing dog would remain permissible.93  The 
dissent expressed concern that the breadth of the Court’s holding in Kyllo 
would bar new detection devices that are limited in the same way as dog sniffs 
and could otherwise be deemed constitutional.94 
																																																																																																																																
Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer.  Id.  Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, 
joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony 
Kennedy.  Id.  Interestingly, the lineup in the Court’s recent decision in Jones defied expectations, 
with Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Elena Kagan, concurring in 
judgment and strongly endorsing the Katz test.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the majority’s trespass-based approach counters current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and instead favoring an expectation of privacy approach). 
 89. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id.  Kyllo was decided on June 11, 2001, three months before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
Since then, the Court has shown considerable deference to national security considerations.  See, 
e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding statutes broadly 
banning “material support” of terrorism against a First Amendment challenge).  It is unclear 
whether the Court would be as deferential in the context of the Fourth Amendment, especially for 
radiation-scanning devices, even in the face of national security considerations. 
 91. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983)); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (“Here, as in 
Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually 
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing 
as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”).  But see infra notes 190–92 and accompanying 
text (describing the Court’s recent holdings involving narcotics dog sniffs, including Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Florida v. Jardines, which held that a trespass occurred when law 
enforcement brought a drug-sniffing dog onto the front porch of a home, which police suspected 
housed a marijuana-growing operation, and the unanimous decision in Florida v. Harris, which 
held that a canine sniff of a car during a traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment and 
also provided probable cause for a subsequent search of the vehicle for narcotics). 
 92. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93. See id. (noting that the category of sense-enhancing technology was extremely broad). 
 94. Id. at 48 (“Nevertheless, the use of such a device would be unconstitutional under the 
Court’s rule, as would the use of other new devices that might detect the odor of deadly bacteria 
or chemicals for making a new type of high explosive, even if the devices (like the dog sniffs) are 
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C.  Checkpoints and the “Special Needs” Doctrine 
In certain limited cases, the Court has authorized temporary seizures by the 
police, without a requirement for a search warrant or reasonable suspicion.  In 
1979, the Court noted in Brown v. Texas, albeit in dicta, that the Fourth 
Amendment allows for seizures “carried out pursuant to a plan embodying 
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”95  Three 
years before Brown, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court upheld 
internal checkpoints for illegal immigrants on California and Texas highways 
located at least sixty miles from the Mexican border, as long as the checkpoints 
were “routinely conducted.”96 
Eleven years after Brown, the Court expansively applied the Brown “neutral 
limitations” rule to uphold police sobriety checkpoints in Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz.97  Citing the “slight” inconvenience of a 
police checkpoint and a checkpoint’s effectiveness at reducing the number of 
intoxicated drivers, the Court upheld the sobriety checkpoints against a Fourth 
Amendment challenge. 98   Notably, Sitz found that the “fear and surprise” 
generated by a checkpoint search was less than that of a random stop—a key 
factor in the Court’s determination.99 
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, however, the Court restricted the use of 
checkpoints, reining in the reach of Sitz by invoking the special needs 
doctrine.100  Although Sitz cited the special needs doctrine and proceeded to 
ignore it, Edmond approvingly cited cases allowing suspicionless searches only 
where the government could claim “special needs, beyond the normal need for 
																																																																																																																																
‘so limited both in the manner in which’ they obtain information and ‘in the content of the 
information’ they reveal.” (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707)). 
 95. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 558–62 (1976)). 
 96. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566 (“[W]e hold that stops for brief questioning routinely 
conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be 
authorized by warrant.”).  However, Martinez-Fuerte cautioned that “our holding today is limited 
to the type of stops described in this opinion.”  Id. at 567. 
 97. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing Brown, 443 
U.S. at 50–51). 
 98. Id. at 451, 455 (“In sum, the balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken 
driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the 
degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state 
program.”). 
 99. Id. at 452–53. 
 100. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).  Under this doctrine, “‘special 
needs’ beyond normal law enforcement . . . may justify departures from the usual warrant and 
probable-cause requirements.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) 
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1987)).  Although the special needs 
doctrine can justify warrantless searches, the Court in Edmond used the doctrine instead to rein in 
the use of checkpoints by the police.  See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
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law enforcement.”101  Based on the revived special needs doctrine, the Edmond 
Court held that checkpoints for narcotics violated the Fourth Amendment.102  
The Court distinguished its prior cases based on three factors. 103   First, 
checkpoints may not be used “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing” or serve the “general interest in crime control.”104  Second, the 
threat that law enforcement is responding to must pose an “immediate hazard” 
and have an “obvious connection . . . [to] the law enforcement practice at 
issue.”105  Finally, the “gravity” of the problem the government is trying to 
address “weighed heavily” in the Court’s constitutional analysis.106 
Understandably, the majority in Edmond was concerned with line drawing.  
Without a clear limiting principle, the Court feared that “there would be little 
check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any 
conceivable law enforcement purpose.”107  Although the Edmond Court ruled 
out narcotics interdiction as a sufficient justification for a checkpoint, it did not 
per se foreclose other possible uses, if the justification met the three 
aforementioned criteria.108 
Since Edmond, the Court has slightly relaxed its view of checkpoints, 
perhaps indicating a warming to their other potential uses.109  In Illinois v. 
Lidster, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a police checkpoint  
that stopped motorists to ask about a fatal hit-and-run accident that  
occurred one week earlier.110  Rejecting an “Edmond-type rule of automatic 
unconstitutionality,”111  the Court cited the three-part balancing test articulated 
in Brown v. Texas.112  The Court held that that constitutionality of a checkpoint 
depends on “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the 
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty.”113 
																																																								
 101. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (listing cases applying the special needs doctrine); see also 
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450 (refusing to apply the special needs doctrine). 
 102. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47–48. 
 103. See infra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 104. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38, 41 (internal citations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 39 (asserting that drunk-driving checkpoints constitute protection against an 
“immediate” threat). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 42. 
 108. Id. at 44 (finding narcotics checkpoints indistinguishable from generalized crime 
control). 
 109. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (distinguishing Edmond). 
 110. Id. at 421–23. 
 111. Id. at 424. 
 112. Id. at 426–27. 
 113. Id. at 427 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). 
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III.  PERMISSIBLE USES OF GUN SCANNERS? 
Applying the patchwork of Fourth Amendment doctrine to a new case has 
proven difficult, even for the Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia has said that he 
“just hate[s] Fourth Amendment cases” because their fact-specific nature 
inevitably leads to “variation 3,542” on the doctrine of unreasonable searches 
and seizures.114  Presuming, however, that the NYPD and DOD develop a 
deployable gun scanner, the constitutionality of this technology will be 
immediately challenged, with near-certain review by the Supreme Court.  This 
Part applies the Court’s current Fourth Amendment doctrine, as outlined 
above, and examines several legal arguments to determine when, if ever, police 
may constitutionally use gun scanners.  Part IV offers a unique argument for a 
new, clearer rule that would allow police use of gun scanners in limited 
circumstances while adequately protecting privacy. 
A.  Post-Arrest and Terry Stop Weapons Searches 
The constitutional authorization for police to search an individual for 
weapons after an arrest or during a Terry stop is clearly defined.115  Thus, 
police use of gun scanners to detect weapons on an individual who is lawfully 
arrested or stopped is unobjectionable because these practices would “simply 
substitute a gun scan for an already legally permissible physical search.”116  
Indeed, because the NYPD gun scanners in development use entirely passive 
technology and do not reveal anatomical details, they would be far less 
intrusive than a traditional Terry frisk.117  So long as the police possess the 
requisite probable cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion that an individual 
possesses a weapon to conduct a stop, replacing a frisk with a gun scanner 
should not raise Fourth Amendment concerns.118 
In the case of Terry stops, police could conduct a “virtual” Terry stop rather 
than physically stopping an individual.  After learning information about an 
individual that would create reasonable suspicion, police officers could scan 
that person for weapons from a safe distance.  Under this scenario, the 
																																																								
 114. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (citing Interview by Susan Swain with Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2009), available at 
http://supremecourt.c-span.org/assets/pdf/AScalia.pdf). 
 115. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (Terry stop); see also Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (arrest); supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 116. Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 567 (noting also that consent searches and “fixed 
administrative searches at high-risk places such as entrances to airports or public buildings” 
would be constitutionally unassailable). 
 117. See Baker, supra note 14 (noting that NYPD gun scanners only detect objects that block 
the scanner’s rays). 
 118. Other constitutional issues, such as Due Process and evidentiary claims about the 
reliability of the technology, may be relevant but are beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert witness testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 597 (1993) (outlining rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence). 
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individual would not have to interact with the police, and officers would face 
less danger.  The “virtual” Terry stop could produce a major improvement in 
community relations by replacing physically confrontational stop-and-frisks 
with scans from a passing police vehicle, resulting in nearly 700,000 fewer 
such “stops” in New York City alone.119  Admittedly, the ease of scanning that 
this technology provides could allow the police to perform more Terry stops 
overall—albeit virtually.  Nevertheless, the actual number of physical street 
confrontations with the police would plummet. 
Doctrinally, this conclusion seems unobjectionable.  But, in practice, the use 
of gun scanners during arrests and Terry stops could pose serious questions 
about police credibility—raising the dreaded specter of “testilying”120  in a 
whole new context.  Dishonest police officers could claim that they used a gun 
scanner after developing an independent basis of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to arrest or stop someone, when, in actuality, they used the gun 
scanner before any existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.121  For 
arrests on an existing indictment or complaint, or based on witness 
identification, the likelihood of lying about gun scanner use would be minimal 
to non-existent.122  On the other hand, for “pick-up” arrests, which often occur 
after a Terry stop, only the officer operating the device and perhaps his or her 
partner would know if reasonable suspicion existed to stop the individual 
																																																								
 119. Legally speaking, an officer using a gun scanner would have virtually stopped and 
frisked an individual.  But, in terms of the public’s perception, there would be no recognition that 
a “stop” had occurred.  This outcome may be worrisome to some, but gun scanners’ ability to 
reduce physical encounters with citizens is undeniable, even to civil liberties advocates.  See 
Wagstaff, supra note 29 (quoting the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union). 
 120. In the wake of several corruption scandals in the NYPD in the early 1990s, an 
independent commission, headed by former New York State Appellate Division Judge Milton 
Mollen, was tasked to investigate the problem.  MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., COMMISSION REPORT: 
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE  
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT 36 (1994) , available at 
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/4%20-%20Mollen%20Commission%20-% 
20NYPD.pdf.  The Mollen Commission determined that, although the actual number of corrupt 
officers was quite small, the NYPD lacked systematic safeguards to detect such corruption.  Id.  
The Commission uncovered a number of disturbing practices, including police involvement in 
selling narcotics, protecting drug dealers, and committing robberies to earn kick-backs and bribes.  
Id. at 36–37.  Mollen also identified the phenomenon of “testilying,” a term used by corrupt 
officers for lying in court to cover up unlawful searches and other improper investigative 
practices.  Id. at 36.  For an academic discussion of “testilying,” see generally Christopher 
Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
 121. Of course, suspicionless scanning may be perfectly acceptable.  See infra Parts III.B, 
IV.B.  However, if the Court limits the use of gun scanners to only Terry stops and arrests, it may 
unwittingly create a powerful incentive for lying by dishonest law enforcement officers. 
 122. If police have independent probable cause to arrest, there would be no incentive for 
officers to lie about using a gun scanner, because a full search is permissible incident to a lawful 
arrest.  See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (holding a search incident to a 
lawful arrest constitutional under the Fourth Amendment). 
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before using the gun scanner.  This may create a situation in which a dishonest 
officer could lie about his or her use of the gun scanner. 
Concerns about police lying to justify a Terry stop are not novel.  Long 
before gun-scanning technology was imagined, Supreme Court Justices and 
law review commentators debated the same issue.123  In Adams v. Williams, 
Justice William Brennan objected to expanding the Terry doctrine to cover 
possessory offenses largely because of the danger of fabricated evidence.124  In 
Adams, after receiving an anonymous tip, a police officer frisked an individual 
and recovered a firearm, 125  Justice Brennan worried that using unnamed 
informers as the basis for a Terry stop was problematic because it “readily 
[could] have been manufactured by the officer after the event.”126 
Similarly, in Florida v. J.L., the Court unanimously held that an anonymous, 
uncorroborated 911 call cannot create reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk 
someone for a firearm.127  This holding was largely a prophylactic rule to 
remove incentives for false 911 calls.128  Although the Court never explicitly 
mentioned potential police misconduct in its opinion in J.L., the risk is 
obvious: if anonymous 911 calls could justify a stop-and-frisk, then dishonest 
police officers could simply call 911 and falsely report a person with a gun, 
then stop and frisk that individual.  At oral argument for J.L., Justice Scalia 
raised this concern: 
Indeed, we distrust policemen enough that we have the exclusionary 
rule in order to deter them from conducting unreasonable searches 
and seizures, but I guess it would be pretty neat for the tipster to be 
																																																								
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 124–34. 
 124. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘To begin, 
I have the gravest hesitancy in extending Terry v. Ohio to crimes like the possession of  
narcotics . . . . There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the 
protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true.’” (quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 
F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted))). 
 125. Id. at 144–45 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 127. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (“[W]e hold that an anonymous tip lacking 
indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and frisk 
whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.”). 
 128. See id. at 272 (attempting to prevent “any person seeking to harass another to set in 
motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an 
anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a gun”); see also Peter Erlinder, 
Florida v. J.L.—Withdrawing Permission to “Lie with Impunity”: The Demise of “Truly 
Anonymous” Informants and the Resurrection of the Aguilar/Spinelli Test for Probable Cause, 4 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 65 (2001) (arguing that, because the Court “[made] clear that ‘truly 
anonymous’ informants can never be found reliable, . . . any future case that is based on the use of 
a ‘truly anonymous’ informant . . . will run afoul of the reasoning in Florida v. J.L.”); Edward W. 
Krippendorf, Florida v. J.L.: To Frisk or Not to Frisk; The Supreme Court Sheds Light on the Use 
of Anonymous Tipsters as a Predicate for Reasonable Suspicion, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 161, 190 (2002) (“[I]t is clear that although the Court appeared to stress the 
predictive nature of the tip, the true concern lies with the caller’s reliability.”). 
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another policeman.  All you have to do is allege that the person has a 
gun, and it will permit a search . . . a body search, which may not 
uncover a gun, but may well uncover marijuana, cocaine, or some 
other unlawful contraband.129 
In addition to Justice Scalia’s comments, the defendant in J.L. cited evidence 
that police fabrication was “a major problem in New York, Los Angeles, 
Atlanta, New Orleans, Detroit, Minneapolis and Philadelphia.”130 
The Court is unlikely to address the “testilying” issue with a broad rule 
prohibiting gun-scanner evidence because such a ruling would necessarily call 
Terry itself into question.131  Although gun-scanning technology may tempt 
officers to use the devices even when they lack reasonable suspicion to stop an 
individual, the potential for lying is not greater than in any other context.132  
The solution will likely be the same for gun-scanner evidence as it currently 
stands for traditional police observations leading to a Terry stop: evaluation of 
the officer’s credibility at an exclusionary hearing pursuant to a defense motion 
in limine.133  Although many academics have castigated judges for allowing 
into evidence what they regard as obviously perjured police testimony,134 
																																																								
 129. Oral Argument at 48:08, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1993. 
 130. Brief for Respondent at 17 n.9, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993), 2000 WL 140926, at 
*17.  The defense cited several law review articles discussing police perjury generally, and one 
specifically discussing fabricated tips.  Id. (citing Joe Metcalfe, Anonymous Tips, Investigatory 
Stops and Inarticulate Hunches—Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 219, 237 (1991)). 
 131. Only in the case of police lineups conducted after formal criminal proceedings have 
begun (and without a defendant’s attorney present) has the Court banned evidence obtained as 
presumptively unreliable.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967) (citing the “grave 
potential for prejudice” by the police).  Justice Byron White dissented: “I do not share this 
pervasive distrust of all official investigations.  None of the materials the Court relies upon 
supports it.”  Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).  The holding in Wade, however, hinged on the 
formalist distinction of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel “attaching” after 
formal proceedings have commenced.  Id. at 223–27 (majority opinion).  As such, the Court did 
not extend this per se exclusionary rule to identifications of defendants before the start of formal 
proceedings, in which the Sixth Amendment does not apply.  See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
690 (1972) (declining to implement a per se rule). 
 132. Descriptions, such as observing “furtive movements,” a bulge in someone’s clothing, or 
suspicious behavior, are all commonly used to articulate reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.  
See, e.g., United States v. Nosworthy, 475 Fed. App’x 347, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The court 
also found that [the police officer’s] testimony that [the defendant] made furtive movements 
towards his rear pocket was credible, and therefore concluded that the search of [the defendant’s] 
person was lawful.”). 
 133. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When a police officer testifies that 
a suspect aroused the officer’s suspicion, and so justifies a stop and frisk, the courts can weigh the 
officer’s credibility and admit evidence seized pursuant to the frisk.”).  By contrast, an 
anonymous caller can “lie with impunity.”  Id. at 275. 
 134. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias 
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 255 (1998) 
(quoting Prof. Alan Dershowitz’s anecdotes of hearing “bogus testimony” by police and seeing 
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judges in New York City, in both state and federal courts, have  
suppressed evidence because of officers’ disingenuous testimony. 135  
Realistically, civil liberties groups seeking a blanket prohibition on the use of 
gun scanners would have to lobby legislators for a statutory ban, while in 
individual cases, defendants can attack the arresting officers’ credibility in 
suppression hearings. 
B.  Suspicionless Scanning	
Although the law surrounding the use of gun scanners for arrests and Terry 
stops is relatively straightforward, the constitutionality of police use of  
gun-scanning technology without any reasonable suspicion is unclear.136  On 
the one hand, there is potential to reduce thousands of intrusive  
stop-and-frisks with a non-invasive scan that would only reveal weapons—far 
less than what people now routinely expose themselves to at airports. 137  
Conversely, it seems to strain the English language to argue that discovering 
what is underneath a person’s clothing does not constitute a “search.” 
Any inquiry about the permissibility of “sense-enhancing technology,” such 
as gun scanners, must begin with Kyllo.138  Although the facts of Kyllo were 
limited to a thermal scan of a defendant’s home, its holding may also be 
applicable to searches of one’s person.139  The four dissenters in Kyllo noted 
that it would be illogical not to extend Kyllo’s rule to searches of 
individuals,140 and Justice Scalia has consistently advocated greater fidelity to 
																																																																																																																																
how “the judge shakes his head in knowing frustration, but accepts the officers’ account as 
credible”); David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
455, 464 (1999) (“Judges should encourage a much deeper exploration of the issue of police 
credibility than presently occurs in our criminal courts.”); Alan M. Dershowitz, Op-Ed., 
Controlling the Cops: Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A17 (“Officers know 
that in many courtrooms they can get away with the most blatant perjury without judicial rebuke 
or prosecution.”). 
 135. See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, but Few 
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion 
/12guns.html (claiming that some officer testimony is “patently incredible”). 
 136. See supra note 117 any accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 117 any accompanying text. 
 138. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“To withdraw protection of this 
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 139. See supra notes 74–90.  But see Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 573 (arguing that “there 
is abundant language in Kyllo suggesting that its rule will likely be limited to searches of 
homes”). 
 140. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Clearly, a rule that is designed to protect 
individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment should not be limited to a 
home.”).  The Court has also endorsed this logic in other cases.  See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his 
person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis 
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the text and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.141   Additionally, 
although Kyllo does stress that the house is constitutionally special, the opinion 
never states that a lower level of Fourth Amendment protection applies to 
searches of one’s person.142 
Under Kyllo’s holding, suspicionless use of the NYPD’s prototype gun 
scanners would likely violate the Fourth Amendment because gun scanners are 
a “sense-enhancing technology” “not in general public use” that provides 
police with “information . . . that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”143  Thus, the 
use of gun scanners would constitute a “search” that is “presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”144 
This application of Kyllo seems to foreclose any suspicionless use of gun 
scanners.  But given the tremendous public safety benefits that such devices 
could provide, there will undoubtedly be pressure to find a permissible use.145  
Although a new rule is proposed in Part IV, under the current doctrinal 
framework, upholding gun scanners’ constitutionality requires making one of 
three arguments: (1) overturn Kyllo; (2) limit Kyllo to homes and apply the 
general rule from Katz instead; or (3) find a Fourth Amendment exception for 
unobtrusive searches that only reveal contraband. 
1.  Overturn Kyllo 
Kyllo has been alternately criticized as being both overinclusive and 
underinclusive. 146   The most frequent criticism has been the limitation of 
Kyllo’s holding to technology that is “in general public use.”147  According to 
the dissent: 
																																																																																																																																
added) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948))). 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“[W]e must take the long view, 
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.”). 
 142. See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (citing language of the Supreme Court 
that suggests Kyllo is not limited to searches of a home). 
 143. Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 144. Cf. id. at 40. 
 145. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting statistics on the number of national 
shooting victims). 
 146. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United States: A Temporary Reprieve 
from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REV. 728, 731–33 (2003) 
(arguing that, despite hope that Kyllo would be applied to other types of technology, its scope has 
been limited to surveillance of private homes, and only when the device is “not in general public 
use”); Kerr, supra note 87, at 832, 835–37 (describing Kyllo as suggestive of “broad and even 
creative” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, yet actually limited to a specific fact pattern). 
 147. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also Childers, supra note 146, at 759–61 (criticizing Kyllo for 
allowing a gradual erosion of Fourth Amendment protection as certain technology becomes 
widely used). 
2013] Kyllo and Gun-Scanning Technology 623 
[T]he contours of [the majority’s] new rule are uncertain because its 
protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is 
“in general public use.” Yet how much use is general public use is 
not even hinted at by the Court’s opinion, which makes the 
somewhat doubtful assumption that the thermal imager used in this 
case does not satisfy that criterion.148 
This critique, however, does not address the root flaw of Kyllo.  Indeed, it is 
logical to reduce Fourth Amendment protections if a particular  
sense-enhancing technology were truly in widespread use: if civilians use the 
technology frequently, why limit the government from using it for law 
enforcement purposes?149  Rather, the problem with the majority’s holding in 
Kyllo is its blanket prohibition on obtaining “any information” from inside a 
home.150  As this Article argues, certain information simply does not have 
Fourth Amendment value and should not be protected. 
However, even overturning Kyllo may not permit the suspicionless use of 
gun scanners during police investigations.151   Although Kyllo’s rule would 
restrict gun scanners, the constitutionality of this technology under the 
dissent’s proposed holding is still unclear.  The dissent would bar the 
warrantless use of technology that “provide[s] its user with the functional 
equivalent of access to a private place.”152  The issue, then, is whether the gun 
scanner’s output (a blurry outline of a gun on a small computer monitor, with 
no intimate anatomical details) qualifies as the “functional equivalent of access 
to a private place.”153  Literally speaking, the area under one’s clothing is 
certainly a “private place,” but, technologically speaking, the outline of a 
firearm detected by a gun scanner is based on radiation emanating from the 
																																																								
 148. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
 149. For example, if public use of see-through wall technology became widespread, it would 
seem strange to allow neighbors or total strangers to look through the walls of one’s home, yet 
prohibit the police from doing the same on the basis that it violates privacy.  Although such a 
world hopefully will not come to pass, a ready (and less disturbing) historical example does exist: 
binoculars.  If you know that strangers can see you on a rooftop using binoculars, it would be 
unreasonable to restrict the police from doing the same.  Thus, the “in general public use” 
requirement of Kyllo ultimately collapses into Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.  
Compare id. at 34 (majority opinion) (noting the importance of recognizing a “minimal 
expectation of privacy”), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (describing how a court must determine whether one’s expectation of privacy is 
reasonable). 
 150. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasis added).  The dissenters in Kyllo also critique this part of 
the majority’s holding, arguing that police detection of abnormal heat radiating from the walls of 
one’s home is not the kind of information that the Fourth Amendment protects.  Id. at 43 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent argues that the police could have detected this abnormal 
heat through non-technological means, such as observing that snow melted faster on that part of 
the roof.  Id. 
 151. See infra Part IV.C (proposing such a rule to fix this shortcoming). 
 152. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
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gun itself.154  This is indistinguishable from the example of heat emanating off 
of the house in Kyllo, which the dissent found unobjectionable. 155   The 
dissenters would likely object to technology that showed intimate details of the 
home or rebroadcast people’s conversations, but whether that rationale would 
extend to gun scanners is uncertain.  However, potential objections could be 
reduced if gun scanners simply notified officers that a gun was present via an 
audible alarm or generic diagram, rather than showing an image of the person 
scanned.156 
2.  Limit Kyllo to the Home and Apply Katz 
If Kyllo is limited to the home, then the constitutionality of suspicionless use 
of gun scanners would be determined under Katz. 157   Specifically, Katz 
answers the question of whether a search has occurred through Justice Harlan’s 
two-part test.158  Applied to the hypothetical situation of an individual stopped 
after police detected a firearm using a gun scanner, it is likely that the 
individual would have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” 
by concealing the weapon.159  However, the outcome under the second part of 
the Katz test is debatable: is this expectation of privacy “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable?”160  As always, how this question is 
framed is critical, if not outcome determinative.  Although it is doubtful that 
“society” would find an individual’s desire to carry a concealed, illegal firearm 
to be “reasonable,” it is more plausible that “society” would recognize an 
interest in being free from technology that “looks” under one’s clothes. 
Attempting to resolve this question empirically, Professor Jon S. Vernick 
and several other researchers conducted a study of Americans’ attitudes toward 
																																																								
 154. See supra Part I.A. 
 155. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that, because the 
technology only measured the heat emanating from the home’s exterior, there was no unlawful 
gathering of details of the inside of the home). 
 156. The TSA has realized that the less personal an image looks, the less objectionable the 
public will find it.  AIT: Privacy, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/ait-privacy (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2013).  Future airport scanners will not show anatomical details of passengers, 
but instead will only flag potential weapons detected on a generic computer-generated figure.  Id. 
 157. As discussed above, some of the Justices disfavor the Katz test.  See supra notes 82–86 
and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, as Jones makes clear, Katz is still good law: “For unlike 
[Justice Alito’s] concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass 
the exclusive test.  Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 
(2012).  Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opinion also emphasized the need to adhere to 
Katz in cases that do not involve a physical trespass.  Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 158. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan. J., concurring). 
 159. See id.; Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 570 (“By choosing to carry the firearm in a 
concealed fashion, one is clearly evidencing a subjective expectation of privacy.”). 
 160. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  The second part of the Katz test could 
also overlap considerably with the “in general use” requirement stated in Kyllo.  See supra note 
149. 
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gun scanners and concluded that “society does not recognize a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding gun scanners.”161  However, the study framed 
the questions in a way that the Court would likely find impermissibly skewed.  
For example, the question garnering the most support for gun scanners was: 
“Overall, do you favor or oppose police using new weapon detection devices in 
high crime areas?”162  But, if one appliesthe Katz test based on the legality of a 
private action, it is hard to imagine society approving of a dangerous illegal 
practice. 
Instead, one should look to the Court’s general advice from Oliver v. United 
States when applying the second phase of the Katz test: “In pursuing this 
inquiry, we must keep in mind that ‘[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the 
individual chooses to conceal assertedly “private” activity,’ but instead 
‘whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal 
values protected by the Fourth Amendment.’”163  Merely attempting to keep 
something private does not mean that the Fourth Amendment will protect the 
activity; rather, a particular private activity must have some “value” that the 
Court deems worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.164  At times, the Court 
has been generous in its protections of privacy,165 whereas in other cases, it has 
been much more circumspect in assessing whether a privacy interest is 
reasonable.166  The one consistent take-away, however, is that part two of the 
Katz test cannot hinge on the legality of what a person is concealing; rather, it 
turns on how the person concealed it and whether that privacy interest has 
social value.167 
																																																								
 161. Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 570 (citing “overwhelming general support” for 
allowing police officers to use gun scanners”). 
 162. Id.  Eighty-six percent of the 1,232 respondents in Vernick’s study favored such  
police-scanning technology.  Id.  However, the public’s approval dropped to only forty-nine 
percent when questioners “prompted” study participants about the potential loss of privacy posed 
by the use of gun scanners.  Id. 
 163. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 181–83 (1984)) (applying the Oliver Court’s interpretation of the reasonable 
expectation test to the aerial observation of a yard).  In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court noted that 
these expectations work in both directions: “The concept of an interest in privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere 
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984). 
 164. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181–83). 
 165. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990) (“Olson’s status as an 
overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”). 
 166. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (holding that, even without a warrant, 
police may obtain records of the telephone numbers dialed by an individual because he or she 
voluntarily released that information to the phone company when making the calls). 
 167. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14 (applying the Katz test to evaluate the reasonableness 
of the police flying in public airspace over defendant’s home to observe marijuana plants in the 
defendant’s backyard, which was surrounded by a ten-foot fence).  The Court’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis did not ask whether society approves of backyard marijuana farms, but 
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Gun scanners, therefore, cannot be examined under Katz by asking whether 
society approves of people concealing their illegal guns.  Rather, Katz demands 
questioning whether a scan that reveals large metal objects under one’s clothes, 
but no anatomical details, is unreasonable.  In the wake of 9/11, society has a 
higher tolerance for government searches.  For example, the TSA’s airport 
scanners initially produced a strong backlash, but are now commonplace.168  
Further, the precipitous increase in the number of Terry stops by the NYPD 
has only attracted major attention recently.169 
Based on the tone of the Court’s recent opinion in Jones, the Justices seem 
uneasy with the erosion of privacy caused by technology.170  Notably, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones flagged the need for a re-evaluation of 
Fourth Amendment principles in light of twenty-first century technology.171  
However, Jones dealt with police GPS tracking of a suspect’s non-criminal 
movements.172  Although gun scanners could target only illegal activity,173 it 
remains unclear whether this distinction, and the attendant public safety 
benefits, would assuage the Court’s concerns.  Therefore, the outcome of 
																																																																																																																																
whether it was reasonable to expect that no one would look into a private yard from an aircraft 
flying overhead.  Id. 
 168. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  To be clear, the legal rationale justifying 
airport scans and searches is different.  Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on 
the question, circuit courts (which once viewed airport searches as based on consent) now uphold 
them as reasonable administrative searches.  See, e.g., United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (noting in dicta that “blanket suspicionless searches . . . now 
routine at airports” would likely be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment).  Nonetheless, this 
comparison to airport searches is mentioned because it offers insight into what people generally 
perceive as “reasonable,” especially when public safety may be at risk. 
 169. See Al Baker, Judge Grants Class-Action Status to Stop-And-Frisk Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2012, at A2 (reporting that a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, alleging 
illegal police stops, was recently granted class action status by Judge Shira Scheindlin, who called 
the City’s attitude towards the stops “cavalier”).  The case has attracted considerable attention, 
including an announcement from Commissioner Kelly that NYPD officers will receive additional 
training on how to conduct proper Terry stops.  See Sally Goldenberg et al., Kelly Announces 
Changes to ‘Stop and Frisk’ Policies, N.Y. POST (May 18, 2012, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/ray_stop_think_91BuU3AVd3EQFJPftYipJK. 
 170. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012) (stressing that the facts 
showed that the government had “physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information” and this “physical intrusion” constituted a search). 
 171. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]echnological advances . . . will also affect 
the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”).  In dicta, Justice 
Sotomayor also raised concern that many Fourth Amendment rules might be “ill suited to the 
digital age.”  Id. at 957 (critiquing “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”). 
 172. Id. at 955. 
 173. This conclusion would only apply in jurisdictions such as New York City, where 
obtaining a concealed firearm permit is extremely rare.  See infra note 185 and accompanying 
text. 
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suspicionless gun-scanning under the Katz test is still uncertain, highlighting 
the need for a new rule, as proposed in Part IV. 
3.  Exceptions to the Katz Rule 
Although the Katz test generally applies to all Fourth Amendment searches, 
the Court carved out one notable exception in United States v. Place: a “canine 
sniff” by a “trained narcotics detection dog” “in a public place” does not 
qualify as a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 174   In reaching this 
holding, the Court relied on several factors that make a canine sniff “sui 
generis” and, thus, constitutionally permissible.175  The Court reasoned that the 
procedure “does not require opening the luggage,” “is much less intrusive than 
a typical search,” does not “expose noncontraband items that otherwise would 
remain hidden from public view,” and “discloses only the presence or absence 
of narcotics, a contraband item.”176  Overall, the Court’s biggest concern in 
Place seemed to be with the level of intrusiveness of police practices: 
[D]espite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about 
the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.  This 
limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not 
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less 
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. . . . In these 
respects, the canine sniff is sui generis.  We are aware of no other 
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which 
the information is obtained and in the content of the information 
revealed by the procedure.177 
All of the factors on which the Place Court relied in upholding canine sniffs 
in public spaces could also apply to gun scanners, if the technology can be 
perfected to ensure that it reveals only the presence of guns.178  Gun scanners 
involve no physical touching, are “much less intrusive” than frisks, and are 
arguably less invasive than a narcotics dog sniffing one’s belongings or 
person.179  The viability of the comparison between gun scanners and dog 
																																																								
 174. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 175. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 176. 
 176. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that a dog sniff ensures that individuals are not subjected 
to the humiliation of more intrusive measures). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 571–72 (discussing the application of the Place 
dog-sniff rationale to gun scanners). 
 179. A 1999 case from the Ninth Circuit found that a canine drug sniff of a person for 
narcotics was impermissible and violative of the Fourth Amendment.  See B.C. v. Plumas Unified 
Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that “the random and suspicionless dog 
sniff search” of the plaintiff was unreasonable under the circumstances (citing United States v. 
Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 1984))).  However, other circuits have not followed this 
ruling.  See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 223 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a dog 
sniff conducted four-to-five feet from passengers exiting a bus is minimally intrusive and does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
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sniffs depends on two factors: 1) reliability of the search process employed 
(i.e., gun scan versus dog sniff) and 2) the legality of what the search process 
detects (i.e., firearms versus narcotics). 
First, if gun scanners produce false-positive results, in turn causing 
unnecessary stop-and-frisks, the entire Place rationale fails.  The dog sniffs at 
issue in Place were not “searches” because they were “much less intrusive” 
and devoid of “the embarrassment and inconvenience” that other search 
processes entail.180  Similarly, to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge, gun 
scanners must be highly accurate in detecting firearms; otherwise more 
innocent people would be stopped, which would render gun scanners more 
intrusive than current Terry stop procedures.  Because Terry stops can be just 
as demeaning as a search of one’s luggage, reliability of the search is essential 
to the Place exception.181 
Second, Place requires that the procedure “does not expose noncontraband 
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view.”182  For gun 
scanners, this is a two-part challenge: (1) the technology must alert only to 
firearms and (2) the firearms found must be carried illegally.  The first 
challenge requires a technological solution: gun scanners must be able to 
distinguish the shape of firearms from other metal objects that people may 
carry, such as cellphones or keys.  This technological problem, however, is of 
constitutional importance because of Place; thus, any operational use of the 
devices must wait until this problem is fixed, because gun scanners currently 
work from only several feet away.183  The second issue, whether guns are 
contraband, will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.184  In places like New 
																																																								
 180. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.  Although the Place Court did not explicitly rely on the accuracy 
of a canine sniff, the case implicitly turns on the reliability of the search and the rate of  
false-positives, because if a canine sniff or gun scanner is inaccurate, then there will be more 
unnecessary stops. 
 181. See id. at 703–07.  The reliability of a sniff by narcotics detection canines has been 
questioned recently by the media.  See Radley Balko, Illinois State Police Drug Dog Unit 
Analysis Shows Error Rate Between 28 and 74 Percent, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/31/drug-dog-illinois-state-police_n_1376091.html; see 
also Rebecca Leung, Does the Nose Know, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-591477.html. 
 182. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 183. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 573–74 (discussing how the permissibility of gun 
scanners could vary depending on the permissiveness of a particular jurisdiction’s concealed 
firearm licensing laws and whether a state’s requirement to produce a gun permit upon request 
would affect the analysis).  This Article focuses on jurisdictions where Terry stops for firearms 
are frequent, which are almost always also jurisdictions with restrictive concealed firearm laws, 
such as New York City.  See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 9, 
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. argued Mar. 18, 2013), available 
at http://ccrjustice.org/files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf (noting that, between 2004 and 
the first six months of 2012, over 4.43 million stop and frisks were conducted in New York City); 
Permits: Handgun Licensing Information, CITY N.Y., http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html 
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York City, however, where it is nearly impossible for civilians to obtain 
concealed firearm permits, it would be reasonable for officers to conclude that 
a weapon detected using a gun scanner is presumptively illegal, warranting a 
physical Terry stop.185  Given that courts routinely uphold Terry stops based on 
reasonable suspicion that an individual is carrying a firearm in states like New 
York, 186  implicit in those decisions is the assumption that handguns are 
presumptively illegal in places with restrictive gun laws, and their possession 
creates reasonable suspicion to stop an individual. 
Gun scanners seem to fit the exception in Place for dog sniffs,187 because 
they too are “so limited both in the manner in which the information is 
obtained and in the content of the information revealed.”188  However, the 
dissenters in Kyllo believed that the holding in that case was entirely at odds 
with Place, while the majority never even mentioned Place in its opinion.189  
In the 2012 term, the Court addressed whether a canine sniff of the outside of 
an individual’s home—specifically, the front porch—constitutes a search in 
Florida v. Jardines. 190   Drawing on the Court’s recent decision in Jones, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the case was an “easy” 
example of police action violative of the “Fourth Amendment’s property-rights 
baseline,” thus rendering the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
unnecessary.191  However, in the related 2012 case of Florida v. Harris, the 
																																																																																																																																
/permits/handgun_licensing_information.shtml#license_types (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (stating 
that New York City offers five types of handgun licenses). 
 185. Restrictive concealed firearm carry permit laws in states like New York may change in 
the aftermath of McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right 
recognized in [District of Columbia v.] Heller”). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, No. 06-CR-824, 2007 WL 1958894 (E.D.N.Y. June 
29, 2007), aff’d, 548 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008).  But see United States v. Doughty, No. 08-CR-375, 
2008 WL 4308123 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008) (finding no reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop 
during which a firearm was recovered). 
 187. Justice Brennan, in his Jacobsen dissent, believed that the holding of Place clearly 
required that such devices would be constitutional “if a device were developed that, when aimed 
at a person, would detect instantaneously whether the person is carrying cocaine, there would be 
no Fourth Amendment bar, under the Court’s approach, to the police setting up such a device on a 
street corner and scanning all passersby.”  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The logical connection from Place to a cocaine scanner and a gun 
scanner is clear, as both are designed to detect one specifically prohibited item.  See Vernick et 
al., supra note 17, at 572–73 (acknowledging the analogy between dog sniffs and contraband 
scanners). 
 188. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 189. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47–48 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 190. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413–14 (2013) (“We consider whether using a 
drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home is a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). ( 
 191. Id. at 1417 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to, not substituted 
for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is 
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Court unanimously held that a canine sniff of a car during a traffic stop did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, and it provided probable cause for a police 
officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle for narcotics.192  Given the Harris 
decision, it appears that—at least beyond the scope of the home and 
surrounding curtilage—a canine sniff does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, lending strong support for the constitutionality of gun scanners 
under the Place rationale. 
C.  Virtual Gun “Checkpoints” 
A virtual gun checkpoint would not physically stop anyone, unless the 
scanner indicated that a particular individual was carrying a firearm.  Rather, 
an effective virtual gun checkpoint would operate more like the closed circuit 
television (CCTV) camera networks that are already in widespread use by law 
enforcement.193  The police would identify an area with high levels of gun 
violence, potentially in conjunction with elected officials or other community 
leaders, and deploy gun scanners to that intersection or street.194  Proper signs 
would be placed on the street, warning all individuals in the vicinity that they 
are subject to police gun scanners.195 
The legal basis for virtual gun-scanner checkpoints would be derived from 
the Supreme Court’s cases on drunk-driving checkpoints. 196   The Court’s 
comfort level with such checkpoints has varied, ranging from a general 
																																																																																																																																
unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on 
constitutionally protected areas.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012))). 
 192. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013) (“A sniff is up to snuff when it meets 
that test [of probable cause].”). 
 193. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (Sept. 
20, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2010_midtown_security_initiative.shtml 
(discussing plans to employ approximately 3,000 CCTV cameras, from the 1,159 public and 
private sector cameras already in operation in 2010 by the NYPD in Manhattan). 
 194. See Steven Salvador Flores, Gun Detector Technology and the Special Needs Exception, 
25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 135, 152–53 (1999) (arguing that gun detectors could 
satisfy the “special needs” doctrine because of the benefit to officer safety and the extraordinary 
improvement in community relations from reducing stop, question, and frisks). 
 195. For an image of a sign the NYPD currently uses to alert the public to the presence of 
CCTV cameras, see Pranav Bhatt, NYPD Security Camera Sign, Apr. 10, 2011, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/pranavbhatt/5721461445.  Although some readers might think that 
announcing the presence of CCTV cameras (and similarly, gun scanners) would negate police 
ability to catch individuals committing crimes, the NYPD’s experience with CCTV cameras has 
proven otherwise.  See Marcus Baram, Eye on the City: Do Cameras Reduce Crime?, ABC NEWS 
(July 9, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3360287&page=1#.T7rj5I7ekxU (quoting 
researchers who indicate that cameras set up across the country in New York City, Chicago, and 
Los Angeles have been especially effective when they remain in the same place for at least 180 
days).  For further discussion on the possible deterrent effect of warning the public of gun 
scanners, see infra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 95–113 and accompanying text. 
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endorsement in Brown197 to fear of a slippery slope in Edmond.198  Overall, 
taking the Court’s holding in Edmond and its most recent case on checkpoints, 
Lidster,199 the constitutionality of a virtual gun-scanner checkpoint depends on 
several factors, including: “the gravity of the public concerns served by the 
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the 
severity of the interference with individual liberty.”200  There must also be an 
“immediate hazard,” and the checkpoint may not serve a “general interest in 
crime control.”201 
In light of the Court’s more permissive tone in Lidster, an evaluation of 
these factors shows that virtual gun checkpoints could be constitutional.  First, 
the “gravity of the public concerns” regarding gun violence is just as high as, if 
not higher than, drunk driving, for which the Court has approved police 
checkpoints.202  Second, gun scanners would “advance the public interest” by 
removing thousands of illegal guns (just as Terry stops do) without the 
inconvenience of stopping many innocent civilians.203  Third, the “severity of 
the interference with individual liberty” is far less with a gun scanner virtual 
checkpoint than with a DUI vehicle checkpoint.  Individuals walking through a 
gun-scanning checkpoint would experience no delays and would not be 
required to speak with or see police unless the gun scanner indicated that they 
were carrying a firearm.  Fourth, there is an “immediate hazard” from 
individuals carrying illegal firearms, which is similar to the imminent danger 
of a drunk driver (Sitz), and unlike the more attenuated harm of narcotics 
																																																								
 197. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1979) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows 
for seizures “carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct 
of individual officers”). 
 198. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (arguing that without a limiting 
principle “there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for 
almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose”). 
 199. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (holding a checkpoint stop 
constitutional because police actions only minimally interfered with Fourth Amendment liberties 
against unreasonable seizures, and the police contact was a simple request for information and 
distribution of a flyer). 
 200. Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51). 
 201. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (pointing out that the “immediate hazard” was the danger posed 
by drunk drivers on highways).  The prohibition against generalized crime control, the seemingly 
more restrictive factor, was not repeated by the Lidster Court. 
 202. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 457 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).  The Court in Sitz concluded that an annual death toll of more 
than 25,000 people from drunk driving was more than enough to justify police DUI checkpoints.  
Id. at 451 (majority opinion).  In 2010, of the nearly 13,000 murders reported, over two-thirds 
involved firearms.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at tbl. 8. 
 203. In New York City, Police Commissioner Kelly credits stop, question, and frisk practices 
as being “one of the tactics and strategies that helped us reduce murders by 51 percent . . . from 
the decade before.”  Joel Rose, NYPD’s Stop-And-Frisk Tactics Targeted by Critics, NPR (Apr. 5, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/05/ 150059728/lawmakers-target-the-new-york-city-stop-and 
-frisk.  But see Lamberth, supra note 13, at 2 (stating that crediting the stop, question, and frisk 
tactics as being primarily responsible for the drop in that city’s murder rate is “too simple”). 
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traffickers (Edmond).  Although the drug trade is undoubtedly a root cause of 
much violence, including gun violence,204 carrying narcotics creates less direct, 
imminent danger than carrying illegal firearms or driving under the influence.  
Finally, gun-scanning checkpoints—with clear signage warning individuals of 
the scanner’s presence—do not merely serve the “general interest in crime 
control,” but rather address an “immediate . . . threat to life and limb.”205  By 
placing signs to warn people that gun scanners are in use, the police may deter 
individuals carrying illegal firearms from entering that area.206  If gun scanners 
are used in areas with histories of violence, reducing shootings—either by 
arresting individuals or by deterring armed criminals from showing up—would 
be a victory, proving that law enforcement officials’ primary interest is in 
public safety and not just in making arrests or “crime control,” as Edmond 
prohibits.207 
A virtual gun-scanning checkpoint would address a public safety problem 
equally as dangerous as drunk driving, cause no inconvenience for innocent 
civilians, and be unbiased in its operation. 208   Admittedly, the Court has 
cautioned, “the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive” regarding 
checkpoints,209 and “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more 
																																																								
 204. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 41); see also James C. Howell 
& Scott H. Decker, The Youth Gangs, Drugs, and Violence Connection, JUV. JUST. BULL., Jan. 
2009, at 2, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/93920.pdf (explaining an apparent 
correlation between a rise in gang violence and gang involvement in the drug trade during the 
1980s). 
 205. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43. 
 206. Critics might contend that law enforcement’s true motive would be to increase arrests 
because of the need to generate favorable statistics, rather than focusing primarily on deterring 
individuals from carrying guns.  However, although law enforcement undoubtedly has become a 
statistics-driven profession, lowering shooting or murder statistics would be a far greater boon to 
a police commander than recording more firearm possession arrests.  See WILLIAM BRATTON & 
PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME 
EPIDEMIC 271–72 (1998) (discussing the role of statistics in the police profession); see also 
James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A 
Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 147, 171–72 (2007) (noting that crime is most effectively reduced through active 
policing). 
 207. But see Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 575 (arguing that courts “will likely conclude 
that [gun scanners’] primary purpose is to deter crime”).  However, this assessment ignores the 
weight that Edmond places on the immediacy of the threat.  See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43 
(narrowing the scope of the “immediate hazard” factor).  Although the drug trade undoubtedly 
leads to violence, that danger is far more attenuated than illegal firearms, which create an 
immediate threat to public safety. 
 208. Admittedly, bias could emerge in the locations chosen for checkpoints.  However, 
basing checkpoint locations on shooting statistics or likely terrorist targets could be an easily 
implemented neutral metric.  See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and 
the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 876 (2011) (proposing the placement of 
checkpoints searches based on the detection of crime achieved at a particular spot and regularly 
evaluated). 
 209. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
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efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”210  
But given the Court’s direction in Lidster, which upheld a highway checkpoint 
where motorists were stopped and questioned about a week-old hit-and-run 
accident, virtual gun-scanning checkpoints seem far easier to justify; the 
danger to be stopped is greater, and the inconvenience is essentially  
non-existent.211 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH KYLLO 
Many may be satisfied with the likely disposition of gun scanners under the 
current Kyllo rule, namely, that police cannot scan for guns indiscriminately on 
public streets, but must only use the scanners during arrests or Terry stops 
based on independent suspicion, and perhaps also at limited checkpoints.  As 
the argument goes, this is the proper balance between Fourth Amendment 
rights and public safety,212 and the only way to avoid the “Orwellian world” 
about which Justice Brennan warned.213  Reasonable minds can disagree about 
gun scanners, and although some believe there are strong arguments under the 
existing law, the use of gun scanners in suspicionless scans or checkpoints is a 
close question under Kyllo.  However, the desirability of the Kyllo rule for gun 
scanners looks far less appealing when the same analysis is applied to law 
enforcement use of radiation detectors. 214   After making the comparison 
between gun scanners and radiation detectors in Part IV.A, the shortcomings of 
the Kyllo rule will become clear.  Then, Part IV.B discusses the Fourth 
Amendment’s role in protecting privacy in a world of constantly evolving 
technology.  Finally, Part IV.C proposes a reformulated Fourth Amendment 
																																																								
 210. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
 211. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004).  Although some may argue that there is a 
“metaphysical” harm of knowing one is under a camera, see Adam Liptak, In the Name of 
Security, Privacy for Me, Not Thee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at C1, the death toll from gun 
violence must outweigh this burden.  Indeed, because CCTV cameras already constantly record 
the public, most people probably would likely agree that having one’s face on video is far more 
personal than the blurry outline produced by gun scanners. 
 212. See, e.g., George Dery III, Remote Frisking down to the Skin: Government Searching 
Technology Powerful Enough to Locate Holes in Fourth Amendment Fundamentals, 30 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 392 (1997) (warning that gun-detection technology could undermine the 
warrant requirement and even the probable cause standard); David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray 
Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 55 
(1996) (arguing that gun detectors should only be used when police already have “some 
reasonable suspicion”); Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 
47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 24–27 (2002) (concluding that the use of gun scanners would probably be 
unconstitutional under Terry, Place, or the special needs doctrine); Ric Simmons, From Katz to 
Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1327 (2002) (cautioning that, as technology allows for less invasive 
searches, the Court may become more permissive to their use, thereby eroding privacy rights). 
 213. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 36–54. 
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doctrine that sensibly balances the evolution of law-enforcement technology 
with individuals’ privacy concerns. 
A.  Radiation Detectors Under Kyllo 
Under Kyllo, the warrantless use of radiation detectors appears to be 
unconstitutional, except during a valid arrest or Terry stop: radiation detectors 
use “sense-enhancing technology” that is “not in general public use” to give 
police “information . . . that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”215  Thus, their use 
would constitute a “search” that is “presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”216 
Some may conclude that perhaps both gun scanners and radiation detectors 
should be unconstitutional.  Although this would be a doctrinally consistent 
and legally plausible argument, it would likely be politically unsustainable for 
the Court to ban radiation detectors in a post-9/11 world.  Indeed, even before 
the 9/11 attacks, the dissenters in Kyllo concluded that police detection of 
“radioactive emissions” would be “an entirely reasonable public service.”217 
An initial reaction to this application of Kyllo, however, might be to 
distinguish radiation detectors from gun scanners on two grounds: (1) the 
danger of radiological weapons is far greater than the danger from guns, and 
(2) radiation detectors always detect illegal materials, while many guns are 
legally carried.  Both of these objections, while intuitively appealing and 
seemingly valid at first glance, are incorrect. 
To distinguish radiation detectors from gun scanners, one could argue that 
the danger of nuclear terrorism is a bona fide “special need” that would not be 
prohibited under Edmond.218  Admittedly, the potential death toll and damage 
from a nuclear attack with an IND would dwarf even the carnage illegal guns 
cause.219  Nevertheless, although the potential harm from an IND attack would 
																																																								
 215. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  As discussed in detail supra, this argument assumes that Kyllo would be 
applicable to radiation scans of one’s person as well as one’s home.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 78–81.  Some might disagree with this comparison and argue that radiation, unlike guns, 
has long been detectable without a search of one’s person.  However, this argument is  
self-defeating.  If technology sets the limits on what searches may occur, then there cannot be any 
objection to gun scanners (at least once they are perfected). 
 216. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 217. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating an acceptance of “drawing useful conclusions” 
from emissions monitoring). 
 218. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).  Alternatively, one could argue 
that radiation-detection devices are equivalent to the sniff by a narcotics dog upheld in Place, 
because, unlike gun scanners, it always identifies contraband.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983).  However, this argument fails for the same reason as the “special needs” 
doctrine fails.  See infra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
 219. Dan Farber, Nuclear Attack a Ticking Time Bomb, Experts Warn, CBS NEWS (May 3, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20003954-503543.html (quoting Matthew 
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be far greater, the likelihood of such an attack is much more remote.220  In 
contrast, gun violence exacts a predictable death toll of almost 10,000 citizens 
each year and an economic harm estimated at more than $100 billion 
annually.221  Although posing a lesser danger than that of a nuclear attack, the 
harm caused by gun violence could still qualify under the Court’s special needs 
doctrine.222 
Concededly, one could then draw a line between gun scanners and radiation 
detectors looking for INDs due to the potential for mass casualties.  However, 
there are two problems with this distinction.  First, the radiation detectors used 
by the NYPD and other law enforcement agencies do not distinguish between 
the radioactive materials used in INDs and those used in “dirty bombs” 
(RDDs).223  Second, experts in nuclear terrorism agree that RDD threats must 
be just as vigilantly guarded against, because they are far more likely to occur 
than INDs.224   Therefore, anyone who is serious about preventing nuclear 
terrorism would need to address both IND and RDD threats. 
RDDs would produce a lower death toll than INDs, with most of the 
casualties caused by the conventional explosive at the heart of the bomb, rather 
than the dispersed radioactive material (known as the “dirty” components).  
Although the public fear of radiation from an RDD plus the cost and time 
involved in decontaminating the blast area still make RDDs a serious terrorist 
threat,225 there would likely be fewer lives lost than the annual death count 
from illegal firearms. 
Alternatively, to try and maintain a distinction between the constitutionality 
of gun scanners and radiation detectors, one might argue that radiation 
detectors only reveal serious risks because any radiation alarm creates a life or 
death situation for an entire city or region.  But, this argument is also incorrect.  
																																																																																																																																
Bunn, a Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and an expert 
on nuclear proliferation and terrorism, who estimates that “a 10-kiloton bomb (equivalent 
explosive power to 10,000 tons of TNT and modestly smaller than the Hiroshima bomb) 
detonated in midtown Manhattan in the middle of a workday could kill half a million people and 
cause $1 trillion in direct economic damage”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 5, at 11; see also Philip J. Cook et al., The Medical Costs 
of Gunshot Injuries in the United States, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 447, 449 (1999) (estimating the 
cost to taxpayers for the medical care of uninsured gunshot victims). 
 222. The Court has, however, been reluctant to delineate exactly what qualifies as a “special 
need.”  Although it approved suspicionless testing of public high school athletes for drugs in 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995), the Court found 
suspicionless drug testing of pregnant women in public health facilities unconstitutional in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001). 
 223. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 224. Miles O’Brien, How Tough Is it to Build a Dirty Bomb?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/jan-june11/dirtybombs_02-08.html (noting that a 
dirty bomb is not as difficult to construct as an atomic weapon). 
 225. Id. (calling a dirty bomb a “weapon of mass disruption versus a weapon of mass 
destruction” (emphasis added)). 
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To date, the only people stopped because of radiation-detector alarms have 
been nuclear medicine patients.226  These individuals must explain to a law 
enforcement officer why they set off a radiation detector, requiring them to 
divulge medical information that most people would consider to be at the very 
core of privacy—an acknowledgement that the individual is undergoing cancer 
treatment, or has taken a diagnostic test for a serious, unknown ailment.227  
Such conversations will occur on a public street, perhaps within earshot of 
family, employers, or total strangers.  In contrast, gun scanners, if the 
technology can be perfected and if operated only in areas with restrictive 
handgun laws, will only identify illegal activity. 
But, if detecting RDDs qualifies as a “special need,” then the distinction 
does not hinge on the total number of deaths, but rather on the public fear of a 
terrorist attack.  Although clean-up costs might be higher with RDDs, terrorist 
use of gun violence could easily exact a death toll just as high and cause equal 
amounts of public panic.  The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, used 
guns and small explosives to kill 174 people in an area of the city popular with 
tourists.228  The fear generated by these gun attacks—referred to as “Mumbai’s 
9/11”—severely hurt the city’s tourist industry.229  Under this logic, if radiation 
detectors can be deployed to guard against RDDs, then gun scanners should be 
permissible in areas where an “active shooter” terrorist attack, like those in 
Mumbai, might occur.230 
Thus, the current Kyllo doctrine leads to a troubling outcome   Radiation 
detectors for INDs and RDDs seem permissible under the “special needs” 
doctrine, as do gun scanners, in potential terrorist target locations.  This means 
that the Fourth Amendment would only prohibit the police from using gun 
scanners to prevent shootings in the not-so-nice parts of town, essentially 
																																																								
 226. Another group of people improperly stopped are individuals carrying legitimate 
industrial devices.  See Hennelly, supra note 53. 
 227. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
 228. Delnaaz Irani, Surviving Mumbai Gunman Convicted over Attacks, BBC NEWS (May 3, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8657642.stm (describing the destruction and loss in 
Mumbai). 
 229. Saikat Chatterjee, Mumbai Terror Attacks Hit India Tourism at Start of Peak Season, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&refer=home&sid=a3U1oH1zXjJM; Zoe Wood et al., India Counts the Cost of Global 
Terrorism, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/30/india 
-mumbai-terrorist-recovery-economics. 
 230. The NYPD considers an active shooter attack to be a serious threat.  To prepare for such 
an attack, the NYPD has given specialized training to its own officers and held training sessions 
to educate security personnel in buildings in New York.  See Sean Gardiner, NYPD’s Lessons 
Learned from Tucson-Style Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Jan 20, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com 
/metropolis/2011/01/20/nypds-lessons-learned-from-tucson-style-shootings.  Additionally, the 
Department prepared a 200-page manual outlining best practices for responding to an  
active-shooter attack.  N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, ACTIVE SHOOTER: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
ANALYSIS FOR RISK MITIGATION (2011), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public 
/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter.pdf. 
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constitutionalizing second-class policing of neighborhoods with high gun 
violence.  Yet Terry stops, which engender community disenchantment with 
police and government, could continue unabated.  Tourists get scanned without 
harassment and inner-city residents get stopped and frisked.  This unavoidable 
conclusion strikes one as a deeply uncomfortable outcome under the current 
doctrine, revealing the flaws in applying Kyllo to emerging weapons-detection 
technology. 
B.  The Fourth Amendment’s Purpose in the Twenty-First Century 
The permissibility of gun scanners ultimately depends on one’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s purpose.   To the Founders, “the 
Fourth Amendment was designed in part, indeed perhaps primarily, to outlaw  
[] general warrants” that authorized blanket searches of one’s home.231  Yet, 
the Fourth Amendment is not a blanket protection of privacy, as Jacobsen 
notes: “The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere 
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the 
attention of the authorities.”232  The text of the Fourth Amendment recognizes 
this inherent tension between the desire to ban “unreasonable searches,” and 
the need for effective law enforcement.233 
Compared to the home, which has more robust warrant requirements, frisks 
for weapons on one’s person have long been permitted on a much lower 
showing of reasonable suspicion. 234   The Court accepted these privacy 
infringements because the danger is grave and the government could at least 
point to some suspicion of criminality to justify a brief Terry stop.235  But, 
when the police stop innocent individuals, resentment can build.  After all, 
“[b]y the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police action 
to legal restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the 
innocent.”236 
Provided that gun scanners can be improved to near-perfect accuracy,237 the 
technology does not implicate the core concerns of the Fourth Amendment 
because the scanners require no physical intrusion, reveal no personal details, 
and detect only contraband.  This raises the question: what is constitutionally 
																																																								
 231. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 191 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 232. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984). 
 233. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”). 
 234. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1968) (permitting a brief detainment and frisk for 
weapons on the basis of reasonable suspicion). 
 235. Id. at 22. 
 236. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 237. This accuracy requirement is critical, without which one could readily concede that the 
suspicionless use of gun scanners would be impermissible. 
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“unreasonable” about such a device?  Some critics will respond with concerns 
about innocent individuals who are exposed to gun scanners.  Is this not a 
modern version of the “general search” that the Framers hated?  The answer is 
no: the effect on an individual subjected to a gun scanner is essentially  
non-existent because all that the police will see is a blurry outline of  
an individual’s body without any distinguishable anatomical details.238  By 
comparison, a search of one’s home or the use of a wiretap reveals intimate 
details, and a Terry stop leads to a physically invasive frisk.  Effectively, the 
law-abiding citizen walking by a gun scanner is in no worse a position than the 
law-abiding citizen walking by a commonplace CCTV camera.  Indeed, gun 
scanners invade individuals’ privacy to a lesser extent than surveillance 
cameras because they do not capture any identifying features. 
Society should be far more comfortable with passive gun scanners than with 
the risks and resentment created by millions of Terry stops each year.  Courts 
justify police stop-and-frisks at gunpoint because of “furtive movements,”239 
issue search warrants based solely on an informant’s tip, 240  and hold that 
individuals have no privacy interest in the numbers they dial on their 
telephones.241   By comparison, then, it seems strange to rule that neutral, 
detached gun-scanning technology would somehow be “unreasonable.”  As 
Americans dutifully take off their shoes and subject themselves to revealing 
body-image scans at airports, society must ask whether an individual’s need 
for some kind of “metaphysical”242 privacy on the sidewalk is worth the cost of 
millions of Terry stops each year. 
The Fourth Amendment has adjusted to advances in technology while 
maintaining a proper balance between society’s dual interests in law 
enforcement and privacy.  Undoubtedly, technology changes what is 
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.  Even Justice Scalia, the Court’s 
most dedicated originalist, conceded this point in Kyllo: 
																																																								
 238. See NYPD Tests Technology, supra note 23 (picturing a blurry outline of one’s body 
with a highlighted outline of the concealed weapon). 
 239. See, e.g., United States v. Pughe, 441 F. App’x 776, 778 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
federal agent’s testimony about the defendant’s “furtive movements” contributed to the agent’s 
probable cause to search); United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that 
“furtive movement[s] provide[] a legal basis for [a] protective search”); People v. Mundo, 780 
N.E.2d 522, 523 (N.Y. 2002) (affirming the lower court’s finding that the “furtive movements of 
defendant prior to the stop when coupled with evasive actions of the automobile warranted a 
limited search of the vehicle”). 
 240. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245–46 (1983) (holding that a credible, reliable–but 
anonymous–tip to police could amount to probable cause to obtain a search warrant). 
 241. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735–36 (1979) (holding that, even without a 
warrant, police may obtain records of the telephone numbers dialed by an individual because 
“[the defendant] assumed the risk that the company would reveal the information” that he 
“voluntarily conveyed . . . to the phone company” when making phone calls). 
 242. Vernick et al., supra note 17, at 571 (“At bottom, privacy may be about an almost 
metaphysical sense of vulnerability, akin to the fear in some cultures of having one’s picture [sic] 
taken.” (quoting Liptak, supra note 211, at C3)). 
2013] Kyllo and Gun-Scanning Technology 639 
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by 
the advance of technology.  For example, as the cases discussed 
above [e.g., California v. Ciraolo] make clear, the technology 
enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we 
have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house 
and its curtilage that once were private.243 
Justice Scalia’s reference to Ciraolo is instructive because it shows how new 
technology appears to society when it arises, versus when it is no longer 
novel.244  Today, individuals know that their backyards can be seen by anyone 
flying overhead in a helicopter, but when airplane-surveillance technology was 
new, it certainly must have felt like an extremely intrusive government action.  
This evolution in society’s attitudes towards technology shows that gun 
scanners are simply a modern application of Katz—not a radical departure. 
C.  A New Rule 
Comparing radiation detectors to gun scanners highlights the problem with 
Kyllo’s holding that “any information” obtained using sense-enhancing 
technology that “is not in general public use” is unconstitutional.245  First, 
Kyllo fails to meaningfully engage what privacy values the Fourth Amendment 
is designed to protect.  It is unlikely that individuals would care about a 
temperature reading of the outside of their home, but, on the other hand, most 
people would likely be shocked to learn that the Court has found no privacy 
interest in the phone numbers they dial.  Second, Kyllo unnecessarily freezes 
society’s expectations of privacy in time, when, in reality, society is constantly 
searching for an equilibrium with emerging technology.  In 1789, it would 
have been horrifying to imagine flying constables inspecting the curtilage of 
one’s home from the air, and even in 1989, it would have been laughable to 
suggest that over one billion people would post intimate details about their 
lives on a public Internet forum for inspection.246  Thanks to airplanes and 
Facebook, both of these situations have come to fruition and the Fourth 
Amendment has adjusted appropriately.247 
																																																								
 243. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 215 (1986)). 
 244. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (noting that “[i]n an age where private and commercial 
flight . . . are routine, it is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in airspace”). 
 245. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasis added).  Admittedly, the “at least if not in general 
public use” caveat in Kyllo could allow the doctrine to evolve as technology advances.  See supra 
note 149 and accompanying text. 
 246. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook: One Billion and Counting, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2012, at 
B1 (noting the incredible popularity of Facebook). 
 247. See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209, 215 (upholding police helicopter surveillance of the 
defendant’s backyard); State v. Altajir, 33 A.3d 193, 196–97, 205 (Conn. 2012) (allowing 
publicly viewable Facebook photos to be admitted in defendant’s probation revocation hearing); 
see also Anthony Johnson, Police Are Starting to Use Facebook to Catch Criminals, ABC 7 
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Just as Katz decoupled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from its rigid 
trespass-based origins,248 the Court must similarly free itself from Kyllo’s rigid 
rule.249  Alongside technology’s ability to reveal to law enforcement more 
about private activities, comes the attendant benefit that such intrusions could 
be far more accurate and limited only to contraband.250  In a future case on the 
use of gun scanners, the Court could strike this proper balance by overturning 
Kyllo and holding: A passive device, operating in a publicly accessible area, 
that detects only contraband,251 and does so with near-perfect accuracy and 
without revealing other intimate, confidential, or embarrassing details, does 
not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.252 
																																																																																																																																
ONLINE, http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/video?id=8166978 (last viewed Mar. 10, 2013).  Indeed, 
one could argue that gun scanners are simply the new “plain view,” revealing previously hidden 
information, just like helicopters in Ciraolo.  But see Melissa Arbus, Note, A Legal U-Turn: The 
Rehnquist Court Changes Direction and Steers back to the Privacy Norms of the Warren Era, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1729, 1764 (2003) (arguing that Kyllo “reined in the public exposure doctrine”). 
 248. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), with Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–56, 563–64, 466 (1928) (holding that wiretapping does “not amount to 
a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 249. For a different proposed revision of the Katz-Kyllo syllogism for Fourth Amendment 
searches, see Casey Holland, Note, Neither Big Brother nor Dead Brother: The Need for a New 
Fourth Amendment Standard Applying to Emerging Technologies, 94 KY. L.J. 393, 414 (2006) 
(proposing a sliding scale “merged standard” depending on how new and unexpected the police 
technology is). 
 250. The seeds of this idea come from Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Minnesota v. Carter, 
where he argued that a police officer looking in the window of a suspect’s home, although 
technically a “search,” was not “unreasonable.”  525 U.S. 83, 104–06 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  In fact, this course of action was preferable to obtaining a search warrant that, 
although it was based on probable cause, could easily have targeted the wrong homeowner: “But 
[the officer’s] chosen method . . . more likely have saved an innocent apartment dweller from a 
physically intrusive, though warrant-based, search if the constitutionally permissible observation 
revealed no illegal activity.”  Id. at 105–06 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 251. Other authors have agreed that technology that accurately detects only contraband alters 
the constitutional analysis and may be permissible.  See Sam Kamin, Law and Technology: The 
Case for a Smart Gun Detector, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 222 (1996) (“[W]hat is 
needed is a device that can reliably separate those carrying weapons from those who are not, 
without providing any other information about the individuals being screened.  This hypothetical 
‘smart detector’ would not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and could provide 
law enforcement with probable cause to make a more invasive search.”); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association’s 
Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 449–50 (1997) (summarizing the ABA’s 
guidelines on weapons-detection technology, which recommend allowing scanning procedures 
“when weapons are in fact contraband (as in airports or in jurisdictions that make carrying a 
concealed weapon a crime)”). 
 252. Alternatively, one could conceive of the distinction based on whether the information 
detected is “natural.”  For example, the scent of cocaine and gamma rays from radioactive 
material are clearly “unnatural,” and, therefore, should be subject to police-detection equipment.  
Conversely, body heat and brainwaves are generated by everyone, are natural, and, thus, should 
not be subject to police-detection equipment, perhaps with the possible exception of unusually 
high body heat, which a suicide bomber, for example, might emanate.  Applying this distinction, 
gun scanners use the terahertz radiation emitted by a firearm to detect the outline of weapons, and 
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This rule would also apply to detection of indirect evidence of contraband, 
such as the heat emissions from the house in Kyllo—as long as the detection 
occurred in a public area without compromising other privacy interests.253  
Under this proposed rule, the actual thermal scan in Kyllo would be 
permissible, as would the use of gun scanners and radiation detectors.  
Warrantless thermal scanning, however, showing “at what hour each night the 
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,”254 as well as warrantless 
wiretaps, voice amplification devices, hidden cameras in a suspect’s home, or a 
scan of the emails on individual’s cell phone in their pocket would remain 
unconstitutional.255  Notably, in the case of gun scanners, this rule could only 
apply in jurisdictions like New York City where concealed firearms are almost 
always illegal.256 
Such a rule would not chill any protected activities and would not be a 
slippery slope to an “Orwellian world.”  Instead, it draws a very clear 
exception for devices that can accurately detect contraband without invading 
other privacy interests.257  This rule intrudes far less into individuals’ privacy 
rights than airport security checkpoints, backyard aerial surveillance, or 
collections of dialed phoned numbers.  This rule remains faithful to Katz, yet 
modernizes  it for the technological innovations facing law enforcement. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Gun scanners may provide both costs and benefits for society.  Concerns, 
including infringement of privacy rights and the possibility of discriminatory 
																																																																																																																																
would thus be permissible.  A holding based on this reasoning, however, might prove 
unpredictable because it is contingent on the evolution of technology. 
 253. As Jones demonstrates, technology is forcing a re-evaluation of Fourth Amendment 
concepts.  Jones adds a new consideration to the Plain View Doctrine by barring GPS data from a 
suspect’s car, even though the vehicle was traveling in plain view on public roads at all times.  
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49, 954 (2012) (implementing the trespass rationale 
for its holding that police action was unconstitutional). 
 254. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (referencing Justice Scalia’s 
hypothetical). 
 255. To be clear, “contraband” includes any substance that would form a valid basis for a 
Terry stop (or arrest) because it is typically illegal (e.g., firearms in a jurisdiction with strict laws, 
such as New York City).  This would also include radioactive materials that, despite having some 
legitimate civilian uses, pose such a grave danger as to justify a Terry stop.  In contrast, a 
hypothetical “Swiss Army Knife Detector” would not be valid because it would detect an object 
with primarily legitimate civilian uses, although such knives could also be used for criminal 
purposes. 
 256. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 257. Because gun scanners do not reveal anatomical details or facial features, they would be 
far less intrusive than either the ubiquitous CCTV cameras or the TSA’s airport scanners.  Gun 
scanners only detect large metal objects carried under clothing and do not detect metal surgical 
implants under skin, thus, the scanners would not reveal private or potentially embarrassing 
possessions to the police.  Understandably, seeing one’s image on a screen naturally prompts 
privacy concerns, but, if one looks at the actual images displayed by gun scanners, see NYPD 
Tests Technology, supra note 23, most people’s concerns would be alleviated. 
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uses of the technology, are valid; however, the benefits of reducing gun 
violence, enhancing police officer safety, and decreasing the number of Terry 
stops that cause resentment for innocent individuals far outweigh the costs.  
Regardless of their benefit, once gun scanners are in widespread use, their 
constitutionality is sure to be questioned.  Current Supreme Court precedent in 
Katz, Kyllo, Terry, and Place create an uncertain future for gun-scanning 
technology.  This is particularly true in instances of suspicionless use, given 
Kyllo’s holding.  Because of this confusion, the Court should adopt a new rule 
that a passive device that only detects contraband with near-perfect accuracy 
and without revealing intimate details of one’s person, does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Ultimately, society must collectively ask why it instinctively finds 
technology designed to stop terrorism (including airport scanners and radiation 
detectors) “reasonable,” while also holding onto the Kyllo rule that likely 
restricts the use of gun-scanning technology.  The threat of terrorism certainly 
looms large in everyone’s mind, but so too should the constant toll that illegal 
gun violence exacts in America. 
 
 
 
 
 
